In light of the new crisis in Franco-Algerian relations, as well as the situation in Mali on the Algerian border, we had the opportunity to speak to Akram Kharief, an Algerian journalist and researcher in the field of security and defence, who gives us the Algerian perspective. The interview was conducted by Denys Kolesnyk, French consultant and analyst, President of the MENA Research Center.
On 20 April, the Algerian Presidency announced the holding of a Council of Ministers meeting chaired by President Tebboune, during which a draft law on general mobilisation was adopted. This bill aims to strengthen Algeria’s arrangements for mobilisation, emergency situations and possibly war. Could you explain the reasons behind its adoption, and the timing?
Strictly speaking, this is not a new law, but rather an amendment to article 99 of the Constitution, which deals with general mobilisation. Until now, this article was considered to be both vague in its wording and rigid in its implementation, notably because it required a major mobilisation of institutional players to trigger such a decision.
In its initial version, Article 99 stipulated that a joint decision of the Government Council and the Security Council was required, accompanied by the opinion of the President of the Senate and the President of the National Assembly. The whole process was therefore based on a broad political consensus.
We do not yet know exactly which draft law has been retained, but two options seem possible. The first would be to simplify the procedure by reducing the number of players involved — perhaps by limiting the decision to the Security Council alone, or to the head of government with the advice of the presidents of the two Chambers. The second, on the other hand, would be more in line with a logic of democratic reinforcement, along the lines of the procedure adopted for sending troops abroad, introduced in the 2022 Constitution. This route would involve a compulsory passage through both Chambers of Parliament for any decision on general mobilisation. But for the moment we don’t know.
The timing of this decision is particularly significant. It helped to shape, and even influence, both public opinion and the political debate in Algeria. It is true that the country is facing an increase in tensions in its immediate neighbourhood, and the timing of this initiative has raised questions. It could suggest a form of escalation or tension in the region, although this has yet to be confirmed.
Algeria is currently facing a number of sensitive issues, including persistent disputes with Mali, concerns over the presence of the Wagner group, tense relations with Morocco, and friction with certain Libyan factions. In this context, this decision could be interpreted as an attempt by the regime to close ranks internally, to unite national opinion around a stance of firmness or vigilance in the face of a regional environment perceived as unstable.
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the Algerian government tends to use dramatisation to ensure the cohesion of the internal front and to silence debate and contradictions.
Let’s talk about the diplomatic crisis between France and Algeria, which resumed just a fortnight after hopes of a rapprochement. Emmanuel Macron ordered the expulsion of twelve Algerian consular officials and recalled the French ambassador in response to a similar measure taken by Algiers. Could you explain the real cause, in your view, of Franco-Algerian relations, which have been stagnating for some time now?
The current crisis between France and Algeria has its origins in the French decision to recognise Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara. This act was perceived in Algeria as a breaking point, triggering a series of tense, even virulent exchanges between Algiers and Paris. Subsequently, tensions intensified on the French side, notably through the positions taken by Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau on the OQTF (obligation to leave French territory) and other bilateral disputes.
One of the most notable cases was the expulsion of an Algerian influential figure living in France, whose removal was overturned by the French court on procedural grounds. This incident fuelled the idea, on the Algerian side, that the crisis was not between the two States but rather between Algeria and a certain fringe of French political circles, in this case the far-right. However, the Minister of the Interior, although classed as right-wing, was perceived in Algeria as the embodiment of this hostility, exacerbating tensions.
An attempt at appeasement has nevertheless been made. On 1 April, the presidents of the two countries published a joint communiqué marking a return to normality and announcing concrete commitments, such as French investment and a relaunch of security and judicial cooperation. In this context, progress was expected on consular issues, in particular the processing of laissez-passer for expulsions.
However, this positive momentum was interrupted a few days later, following a case involving an Algerian dissident who had taken refuge in France and was being prosecuted in both countries for serious offences. The man, who had been granted political asylum, was allegedly the target of an attempted kidnapping on French territory. The investigation implicated an Algerian consular agent, whose telephone had been connected near the target’s home. This alone was enough to justify his arrest by the French authorities, provoking the ire of Algiers, which denounced a violation of diplomatic law.
In response, Algeria expelled several French agents, presumably linked to the Ministry of the Interior. France reciprocated by expelling 12 Algerian agents. This latest episode has rekindled the argument, defended on the Algerian side, that certain French actors — particularly in the Ministry of the Interior — are sabotaging efforts at reconciliation between the two heads of state.
Historically, this dynamic is not new. Already under Jacques Chirac, a Franco-Algerian friendship treaty was under discussion, aimed at strengthening economic and human links. But this project was torpedoed by the adoption in France of a law highlighting the ‘benefits’ of colonisation, provoking a clean break.
So, on both sides, we see an alternation between the political will to forge closer ties and hostile actions by certain actors of the state apparatus, which puts a long-term brake on any lasting normalisation of relations.
But what concrete steps do you think the two countries can take to rebuild trust, particularly in economic and security cooperation? And how might domestic dynamics in France and Algeria limit these efforts?
The relationship between France and Algeria cannot be understood through the classic prism of development aid or economic support. Algeria is not a poor country. It is not looking for financial assistance, nor is it dependent on foreign investment to ensure its stability. This observation, which is often forgotten in public debates in France, has a dual significance. On the one hand, it removes an ambiguity: the French taxpayer does not have to ‘pay’ for good bilateral relations. But this situation also complicates the reading of current tensions, by revealing their profoundly political, memorial and symbolic nature.
The remaining differences between the two countries are part of the long history of colonisation. From the Algerian point of view, France has not yet fully acknowledged the crimes of the colonial past, as it has done for other dark episodes in its history, for instance, collaboration during the Second World War and the persecution of the Jewish population. Algeria still bears the scars of 132 years of colonial domination, economic pillage and mass violence, as well as the lingering effects of the nuclear tests carried out on its soil before and after independence.
In this context, a strong symbolic gesture on the part of France, for instance clear recognition of the crimes of colonisation, could be a major step forward. It is not, however, a question of accusing today’s France, but rather of settling a debt of memory, as it has been done at regarding other issues of the past. Similarly, the issue of decontaminating former nuclear sites remains a sensitive one. It is not so much a matter of financial compensation as a call for responsibility, technical cooperation and recognition of the facts.
Once this symbolic ground has been laid, it is possible to envisage a new form of partnership. A friendship treaty could lay the foundations for structured and lasting cooperation, through joint projects involving both countries over the long term. These could include strategic energy infrastructure, such as a gas pipeline, or cooperation in the field of civil nuclear power, based on ‘land lease’ economic models. The key is to create a form of positive interdependence that binds the two countries together over time, let’s say, over twenty or thirty years.
Alongside these issues of sovereignty and memory, the question of migration remains an area of tension. In France, the debate is dominated by the denunciation of illegal immigration and the shortcomings of the OQTF. But this discourse overlooks a fundamental fact: France also benefits massively from Algerian elites. Thousands of doctors, engineers and qualified personnel, trained at great expense by Algeria, now keep the French health system running. This ‘brain drain’, often presented as an opportunity for individuals, also represents a deadweight loss for the country of origin.
If France wants a sincere dialogue on migration issues, it must also recognise this asymmetry. It could, for example, support medical training in Algeria, or invest in local specialisation courses, to offer prospects to those who would otherwise leave. This is not about limiting mobility, but creating the conditions for choice, rather than exile.
But whether or not to immigrate is a matter for the individual, not the French state. We can’t say that France is forcing North Africans to come and live in France, can we?
I completely agree with you. What’s more, it should be remembered that the Algerian authorities, like those in Morocco and Tunisia, are not opposed to the migration of criminals, any more than they are to the migration of doctors. But for me, this calls into question the coherence of French policies, which denounce the one while benefiting from the other. A common, balanced and lucid approach is possible. It would require a shared vision of responsibilities, a reciprocal effort and a genuine common project on both sides of the Mediterranean.
So, to sum up, in your opinion, to relaunch Franco-Algerian relations or get them back on track, the focus should be on symbolic rather than financial aspects?
Yes, absolutely.
I would like to return to the question of France’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara in October 2024. How does this decision affect Algeria’s regional influence and its relations with other Maghreb states, such as Tunisia and Mauritania?
First of all, the autonomy plan for the Sahara, which is now being promoted by Morocco, was conceived by France. It was born at the end of the 1920s in France, out of a French desire to resolve this conflict. So, from the outset, Algeria was not involved at all; there was a bias, even if a sort of neutrality was displayed. But the bias was there. France wanted this and always has. The fact that there is this declaration doesn’t change much. We have always considered that this neutral attitude was more a case of Franco-French cosmetics.
As far as France is concerned, I think the announcement was just a pretext to trigger the crisis. After that, it didn’t change much, as long as Mauritania continued to recognise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and Tunisia maintained a perfectly neutral status on the subject. So, it has had very little effect on inter-Maghreb relations.
Of course, this has strained the relations between Algeria and Morocco, but Algeria does not want the Western Sahara to become independent. Algeria would like to see the application of what was signed by the Polisario Front and Morocco under the auspices of the UN, and I mean the organisation of a referendum. This referendum could also lead to autonomy or even integration with Morocco. And in that case, Algiers would not mind.
Let us now turn to Algeria’s domestic policy. Last year Tebboune’s government used anti-French rhetoric to bolster its legitimacy in the face of accusations of electoral fraud. What role does the subject of France play in the Algerian political debate? And what role does the army has in defining Algeria’s domestic and foreign policy?
France occupies a special position in the Algerian political imagination: it is an easy target. In the Algerian context, attacking France remains a low-risk and often high-reward posture. Even opposition figures, despite their criticism of those in power, do not generally defend France against its detractors. In the event of tensions, they may even find themselves in a form of national unity against France. This is largely due to the symbolic burden that the colonial relationship continues to carry and France’s failure to officially acknowledge the crimes of colonisation. In times of domestic political crisis, accusing France remains a convenient, even useful, strategy for diverting attention or rallying around a common discourse.
Institutionally, Algerian power has historically rested on three pillars: the presidency, the army and the intelligence services. The presidency has extensive powers, with the head of state theoretically able to dismiss any official. The army embodies the power of coercion, with the ability, as a last resort, to make or break a president. Finally, the intelligence services have long represented the strategic brain of the regime: key players in the political landscape, they control elections, parties and even the opposition, with a capacity for influence that is rarely equalled.
The balance between these three poles was profoundly upset by the illness and subsequent fall of Abdelaziz Bouteflika. On the one hand, the weakening of the President reduced the weight of the Presidency. On the other hand, the intelligence services were partly absorbed into the presidential apparatus, losing their autonomy and arbitration powers. This vacuum has been filled by the army, which has become the dominant player.
Since the presidential election on 12 December 2019, a new balance has been established: a presidency with wide-ranging prerogatives and a powerful army that is now reluctant to get involved in day-to-day political affairs. The Chief of Staff has got what he wanted — a substantial increase in the military budget and the status of Minister of Defence — which gives him extensive control over appointments within the army. For his part, the President, free from any direct military pressure, governs as he sees fit.
This tandem between the army and the presidency functions on the basis of a form of mutual non-interference, but it weakens checks and balances and marginalises any possibility of structured democratic debate. The absence of a strong third pillar, as the intelligence services once were, deprives the system of a referee and makes the whole thing more rigid, less able to absorb tensions or open up space for genuine reform.
So, the subject of France does come up quite often in the political events in Algeria. Don’t you think that the Algerian political debate is to some extent reserving the role of ‘scapegoat’ for France?
It’s not an exceptional phenomenon, precisely because France is an easy subject. But this ease is also found in France. The issue of immigration, particularly from Algeria, is also regularly exploited in French political debate.
So, just because France is often mentioned in Algerian political discourse does not mean that it is a serious or structuring priority. In reality, France is not a central issue for the Algerian population, the political elites or even the army. Instead, it comes up as a symbolic reflex in certain political sequences.
In reality, a Frenchman travelling to Algeria would be warmly welcomed by both citizens and authorities. And conversely, an Algerian migrant living in France enjoys rights and social protection that are significantly better than those available in many African countries. This just goes to show that the actual relationship on the ground is often much more peaceful than political rhetoric would have us believe.
The situation in northern Mali, on the Algerian border, remains tense. On 1 April, a Malian Akinci drone penetrated 2 km into Algerian airspace near Tinzaouatine and was shot down by the Algerian army. Could you explain the dynamics of this conflict?
We need to put things in their proper context, which spans more than thirteen years. Mali was engaged in a complex political process involving a separatist or autonomist rebellion in the north of the country, compounded by the presence of jihadist groups affiliated to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
Algeria, which played the role of mediator, initiated a peace process that culminated in 2015 in the signing of the Algiers Agreements between the central Malian authorities and armed groups in the north. These agreements provided for the signatory groups to renounce their claims to independence, join a political process and be able to integrate into Malian institutions, in particular the army and police, from which they had historically been excluded. It is important to stress that recruitment practices in Mali have long discriminated against certain communities, in particular the Tuaregs and Arabs.
Algeria made a distinction between two categories of actors: the armed political groups that had signed the agreements, with whom there had to be dialogue, and the terrorist groups, against whom the fight had to be all-out.
But this fragile balance was shattered after successive coups d’état in Mali and the emergence of a military junta backed militarily by Russia and the private military company Wagner. The new Malian government unilaterally declared the Algiers Agreements null and void, criminalising all armed groups, including those engaged in a political process. Any form of opposition was equated with terrorism, thus breaking the distinction between political actors and jihadist groups.
Algeria, true to its line, continues to recognise the validity of the Algiers agreements. It does not regard the political groups in the north as terrorists, contrary to the position of the Malian junta. It offers refuge to Malian political leaders and takes in civilians fleeing the violence. It has also consistently denounced Wagner’s presence in Mali, and this hostility was reflected on the ground, particularly during the Tinzouatine confrontation in July 2024, when Wagner elements suffered heavy losses.
These tensions have led to a cooling of relations between Algeria and Russia, with Algiers believing that Moscow is now playing a disproportionate role in the region, in contradiction with historical diplomatic balances.
And how has this history impacted on Algeria’s relations with Russia, given that Algeria is a country that maintains more than close relations with Moscow?
Relations between Algeria and Russia are more complex than they appear. Although Algeria is one of the main buyers of Russian arms and the links between the two armies are historically strong, there is no real political closeness between Algiers and Moscow. The two countries are even competitors on strategic issues such as gas.
When Russia invaded Ukraine, Algeria refused to align itself with Russian positions. Contrary to what some might have anticipated, Algiers did not restrict its gas deliveries to Europe — which would have served Russian interests by exacerbating the energy crisis. On the contrary, Algeria has increased its exports to Europe, thereby helping to limit the surge in prices and secure the continent’s energy supply. This choice was not well received by Moscow.
On the diplomatic front, Algeria has maintained a position of active neutrality. It has never closed its embassy in Kyiv, and the Ukrainian embassy in Algeria has continued to operate normally, with cordial relations between Ukrainian representatives and the Algerian authorities. Ukrainian diplomats were even regularly invited to official receptions, in the same way as their Russian counterparts. While Algeria has not explicitly condemned Russian aggression, it has not supported it either: it recognises neither the annexation of Crimea nor that of other Ukrainian territories. It has not provided any military aid to Russia, just as it has refrained from providing any concrete support to Ukraine.
This position reflects a diplomatic line of pragmatic neutrality, without hostility but without adherence. A stance that Moscow perceives with some disappointment: the Russian authorities consider that Algiers could have shown more solidarity, in a context where Russia’s real allies can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Algeria, on the other hand, continues to call for a cessation of hostilities and a return to a political solution.
And what is Algeria’s role in Malian affairs?
Contrary to popular belief, Algeria has never provided any logistical, material or political support for Wagner’s presence in Mali. There is no Algerian ‘debt’ to Russia in this respect. Only one episode, in 2020, could have given rise to confusion: a plane from Russia flew over Algerian territory on its way to Mali. At the time, the exact identity of the passengers was unknown, although there were indications that they were members of the Wagner group. This was an isolated incident.
From 2021 onwards, Algeria adopted a clear and critical stance towards Wagner’s presence in the region. This criticism became more pronounced over time, particularly since 2024, following the events at Tinzouatine on the Algerian-Malian border. At the time, Algeria firmly expressed its opposition to Wagner’s advance in the region, notably through explicit diplomatic and security signals, without however committing itself openly to a confrontation.
In September 2024, a second attempt by Wagner to strengthen its presence in the area was apparently defused largely thanks to Algerian firmness. It is likely that, faced with this resistance, the Russian authorities put pressure on the paramilitary group to abandon its offensive. In fact, Algeria, without being directly involved in the conflict, may have played a decisive role by indirectly supporting the Tuareg groups opposed to Wagner, thus contributing to a heavy defeat inflicted on the latter at Tinzouatine, where several hundred Russian fighters have died.
Finally, I’d like you to outline Algeria’s foreign policy, its relations with world powers and its interests. What current dynamics do you see?
I would like to add that although Algeria’s position towards Russia is neutral overall, it is tinged with a certain historical friendship. Military ties remain strong, notably through the purchase of Russian arms by the Algerian army. However, this closeness does not necessarily translate into political alignment. Algeria is determined to maintain an independent, balanced and non-aligned stance.
Relations with the United States are particularly good. Algiers and Washington share a mutual respect and common strategic interests, particularly in the field of alternative fuels. Algiers considers Washington to be a reliable partner and long-standing friend.
As far as the European Union is concerned, a re-evaluation phase is underway. Algeria recently called into question its Association Agreement with the EU, arguing that it no longer reflects its interests. A renegotiation is called for to achieve a more balanced relationship. In this context, Italy is Algiers’ main European partner. Strong strategic and economic cooperation has developed between the two countries, recently reinforced under the government of Giorgia Meloni. The friendship between Rome and Algiers dates back to the period before Algerian independence, and has continued to grow ever since.
Turkey is becoming an increasingly significant economic partner for Algeria. It is the leading non-hydrocarbon foreign investor in Algeria. This rapprochement is part of a wider drive to diversify partnerships.
At regional level, Algeria’s foreign policy is based on stability and cooperation. It maintains good relations with the Arab communities in the Sahel, as well as with its Maghreb neighbours. A trilateral alliance with Tunisia and Libya has recently been formed, with the aim of better coordinating joint responses to regional challenges. Significant progress has been made, notably on transport issues — with the opening of rail lines between Algeria and Tunisia — and the sharing of water resources. This last point is crucial in an arid region, and the agreement reached between the three countries represents an important factor of stability for the future.
