In 2023, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies wanted to find out what was really going on at the large field hospital in Amdjarass, in northeastern Chad. Rumors were circulating. The Emirates Red Crescent had started building a medical facility at Amdjarass Airport that year.
The Emirates claim that more than 30,000 patients have been treated there since. But the United Nations and human rights groups also see the site as a hub for drones and other weapons of war arriving on cargo planes from the Emirates and then being sent into Sudan, where war has been raging for two years. After reading the reports, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies sent a mission to Amdjarass in 2023 to investigate. It was denied access—again in 2024, when it tried once more.
Sudan has now filed a lawsuit against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing them of supporting the militia known as the “Rapid Support Forces” (RSF) in the Sudanese civil war. “The United Arab Emirates are fueling rebellion and supporting militias that have committed genocide in West Darfur,” the complaint states.
The first hearing in the case was scheduled for April 10 in The Hague. Sudan is seeking an immediate ruling from the court, demanding “provisional measures” to halt the UAE’s alleged complicity in the Darfur genocide.
At the center of the complaint is the allegation that the RSF militia—backed by the UAE—has committed genocide against the Masalit, a non-Arab ethnic group in the Darfur region. Investigations by Reuters and the organization Human Rights Watch suggest that in 2023, the RSF and allied fighters systematically targeted the Masalit, displacing tens of thousands of defenseless people and carrying out massacres.
The ICJ is the highest court of the United Nations for disputes between states. It has no enforcement powers of its own, but the reputational damage for the UAE would still be severe if the court were to label them supporters of genocide.
“The Sudanese government should prioritize ending this absurd and destructive war and addressing the massive humanitarian crisis,” said Emirati foreign minister Anwar Gargash in a sharp-toned statement. He categorically denies any arms support for the RSF, claiming the UAE’s activities in Sudan are purely humanitarian. The Emirates Red Crescent also insists its operations are entirely humanitarian in nature.
But skepticism about these claims has grown considerably. A New York Times investigation from September 21 of last year points to Emirati arms transfers via Chad. Human Rights Watch identified Serbian rockets fired from an unidentified drone, allegedly sold to the UAE. The UN reported in late 2023 that planes from the Emirates were landing in Amdjarass several times a week carrying weapons and ammunition. Amnesty International has also pointed to armored personnel carriers of Emirati origin reportedly in use in Sudan. All of these would constitute violations of the arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council on the Darfur region. None of this would likely be possible without increasingly close ties between the Emirates and Sudan’s western neighbor: Chad.
From Chad, many weapons are allegedly reaching the conflict zones of Darfur. At the end of March, General Yasir al-Atta of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) threatened that his troops might bomb the Chadian airfields of Amdjarass and N’Djamena, calling them “legitimate targets” in order to disrupt the RSF’s supply lines. In doing so, Sudan’s army openly threatened Chadian ruler Mahamat Déby, who is believed to have accepted payments for facilitating arms smuggling and acting as an intermediary. Déby’s regime is accused by the Sudanese military of serving as a link between the UAE and the RSF. According to a report by the platform Africa Confidential, Déby’s elite soldiers are allegedly even helping to secure weapons deliveries to the RSF.
So far, the Emirates have largely avoided major consequences. The EU has imposed sanctions on six companies that support both the RSF and the regular army. Two of the companies linked to the RSF had addresses in the United Arab Emirates. The United States sanctioned Algoney Hamdan, the brother of RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, who is believed to reside in Dubai. In the summer of 2024, US rapper Macklemore canceled a concert in Dubai due to the UAE’s support for the RSF militia in Sudan.
The rulers of the Emirates appeared unfazed. But why would the UAE risk its reputation—and a potential lawsuit before the ICJ—over Sudan? “The UAE’s interests in Sudan are driven by a range of factors: gold, Red Sea maritime security, food supply, and trade interests,” according to Chatham House. Gold is a major factor. Both Sudanese rivals—the SAF and the RSF—largely finance themselves through gold, with Sudan’s mines among the richest in Africa. Much of this gold flows to the Emirates, which in recent years have become one of the world’s largest gold traders, in part because there is little scrutiny over its origin. In a report, the organization Swissaid wrote: “Between 2012 and 2022, the UAE imported 2,569 tons of gold from Africa that was not declared for export in the countries of origin.” This gold was worth $115.3 billion. In 2022, the last year before the war, Sudan officially exported $2.3 billion worth of gold to the UAE. The actual volume may have been significantly higher. Part of the proceeds was allegedly used by the RSF to purchase weapons in the Emirates; its leader is known to own several gold mines himself.
A spokeswoman for the UAE’s Foreign Ministry denied the allegations: “The UAE categorically rejects any claim that it has supplied weapons or military equipment to any party in the conflict since it began. We reject all baseless and unfounded allegations of UAE involvement in the war in Sudan. We are aware that the UAE is currently the target of a coordinated disinformation campaign aimed at undermining our foreign policy, regional role, and humanitarian efforts.”
But for the Emirates, more is at stake. They aim to shift away from dependence on oil and gas and position themselves as a regional power, with a particular focus on expanding their influence in Africa. The Emirati conglomerate DP World is building container terminals around the globe, including on the Red Sea in Egypt, Somaliland, and Djibouti. Sudan would also be of strategic interest. The country has what the Emirates lack: arable land for grain production and livestock. Emirati companies already cultivate 50,000 hectares there, and shortly before the war broke out, contracts were signed for another 160,000 hectares. There are also political motivations. The UAE accuses the Sudanese army—likely not without reason—of having ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist movement the Emirates oppose wherever possible. Moreover, UAE ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed is reportedly grateful to RSF leader Daglo, who had sent thousands of mercenaries to support the UAE-led coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. Despite this, the war against the Houthis could not be won.
