The rapprochement attempts with Syrian dictator al-Assad are becoming increasingly evident: Erdogan wants to meet with Assad in Turkey or a third country to normalize relations with Syria. He named Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iraqi Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani as mediators for such talks. Since then, pro-government Turkish media have been buzzing with speculation about supposed preparations for such a meeting in Moscow or Baghdad. However, Assad has signaled that he is not interested in such a meeting unless Turkey is willing to discuss a timetable for the withdrawal of its troops from Syria.
As MENA Research has already reported, one reason for Erdogan’s push is certainly the discontent among the Turkish population over the more than three million Syrian refugees in the country. Recently, hostility turned into violence, with Syrian businesses attacked in several Turkish cities after a Syrian was suspected of abusing his niece. Additionally, opposition leader Özgür Özel announced a trip to Damascus to “solve Turkey’s refugee problem” through talks with Assad. Although it is unlikely that a rapprochement between the two countries would lead to a significant return of Syrian refugees, this expectation is widespread among the Turkish public. Erdogan is tapping into this sentiment, essentially selling a dream: “We will make peace with Assad, and the refugees will go back,” seemingly to buy time for his government.
Furthermore, the president in Ankara has taken up the issue since he fears that his ultranationalist coalition partner, Devlet Bahceli, and his MHP party might use the refugee issue to pressure him. Many MHP supporters apparently participated in the attacks on Syrian businesses, some displaying the party’s wolf salute and calling for Erdogan’s resignation. Although the MHP has no interest in forcing Erdogan out, the party has been demanding a bigger share of power since Erdogan’s defeat in the municipal elections in March. Before the anti-Syrian riots, Bahceli had, for the first time in a long while, called for the return of refugees. If he were to repeat this demand, it could create significant challenges for Erdogan. With the MHP’s influence in the police force and its connections to mafia and thug groups, the party could easily incite new riots. Inviting Assad is thus a “preventive measure.”
Even before the recent presidential election in 2023, Erdogan had pushed for a meeting with Assad, which ultimately did not happen. After his re-election, the issue was shelved. However, communication channels were opened at the ministerial level. Intelligence chiefs, foreign ministers, and defense ministers from both countries met, mediated by Russia. This rapprochement was part of Turkey’s new regional strategy. During the Arab Spring, Erdogan had banked on the success of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist forces. When this proved to be a miscalculation, the president reversed course and sought renewed ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In Assad’s case, it’s a reversal of a reversal. Before the Syrian civil war, Erdogan maintained such close relations with the dictator that the two even vacationed together in Bodrum with their families. After the war began, he sided with the rebels seeking to overthrow Assad.
Erdogan’s charm offensive towards Damascus is also linked to global developments. This includes Turkey’s expectation that the United States might withdraw its troops from Syria if Donald Trump wins the next election. Should this happen, the Syrian Kurds would need a new protector, likely turning to the regime in Damascus and Russia. Turkey aims to preempt such a development by reaching an agreement with Assad. Ankara views the Kurdish YPG militia as the Syrian branch of the terrorist group PKK, while for the U.S., the militia is an ally in the fight against ISIS.
Another driving force is the concern that the Gaza war could escalate into a regional conflict. Against this backdrop, Erdogan and Assad want to expand their options. In this context, it’s relevant that the Iraqi Prime Minister, who is allied with Iran, has offered to mediate. This suggests that Tehran is not opposed to a rapprochement between Syria and Turkey. However, significant progress is unlikely for now. A withdrawal of Turkish troops, who currently occupy about ten percent of Syrian territory, seems highly unlikely, especially since Turkey would then have to expect many more Syrians to flee to Turkey from Assad’s troops.
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