By Golineh Djananpour
For a very long time, the mullah regime in Tehran was able to do as it pleased in Syria: producing missiles, supplying weapons to Hezbollah, and training Shiite militias. Syria was the most important hub for Tehran’s power games in the region, primarily directed against Israel, the United States, and the West in general. However, since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime last December, the Islamic Republic has been left empty-handed. The new rulers in Damascus made it clear from the beginning that they would no longer tolerate an Iranian presence in Syria.
Therefore, Iran now seems determined to sabotage the establishment of a new, unified Syrian state. In a speech, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei personally called on the “Syrian youth” to resist the “foreign occupiers.” Meanwhile, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards used their official channels to call for a counter-revolution against the “infidel terrorists,” announcing that Syria’s “liberation” was imminent.
In Syria itself, Tehran’s slogans may largely fall on deaf ears—but Iran knows how to exert influence in more subtle ways. Observers report that the regime has recently launched a large-scale disinformation campaign aimed primarily at fueling religious conflicts in Syria and destabilizing the country’s fragile situation. Social media has been flooded with false or misleading reports of violent attacks against Shiites, Alawites, and Christians, allegedly carried out by fighters from the Islamist militia Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). While it is difficult to prove that Iranian actors are behind these reports, the sheer volume of posts suggests an organized campaign.
Intelligence agencies from several Arab states have reportedly provided the HTS leadership with information indicating that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are preparing to incite an uprising in Syria. Iran can still count on willing allies in the country—many Assad loyalists remain ready to resist the HTS regime. Some supporters of the ousted dictator have reportedly disguised themselves as HTS fighters and attacked members of religious minorities, deliberately stoking hatred against the new rulers.
It is unlikely that such incidents will trigger a new popular uprising. However, the Iranian regime seems well aware that unsettling Syria’s religious minorities creates an ideal breeding ground for undermining HTS’s legitimacy and provoking local resistance. Many Shiites and Christians distrust the Islamists and their agenda. Furthermore, there have been genuine violent attacks, murders, and acts of retribution by HTS fighters against non-believers. The burning of a Christmas tree near the city of Hama in late December sparked angry protests by hundreds of Christians.
Although rebel leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has repeatedly pledged to protect Syria’s minorities, he has taken few concrete steps to fulfill this promise. In the worst-case scenario, allegations of religiously motivated violence could lead to a vicious cycle: local militias, fearing attacks, might refuse to lay down their arms, forcing HTS to take military action against them. At this critical juncture, HTS would need the trust of Syria’s minorities—but the mullahs in Tehran appear determined to undermine precisely that scenario.
