With Donald Trump aiming to relaunch nuclear negotiations with Iran, we spoke to Michel Makinsky, Iran specialist and associate expert at the MENA Research Center, to explore the reasons behind this policy shift and the regional dynamics. The interview was conducted by Denys Kolesnyk, French consultant and analyst, President of the MENA Research Center.
Iranian women are increasingly protesting against compulsory veiling laws, challenging the Iranian regime. To what extent could these actions lead to political reforms in Iran, and what key factors will determine whether these movements result in concrete change?
To be honest, I don’t think these movements will trigger real reforms as such. It’s clear that the pressure exerted by women, who are increasingly refusing to wear the veil, will have an impact. These effects are mainly reflected in the growing difficulty the regime has in opposing this trend. The testimonies we have received clearly show that it is failing to stop this trend on a large scale. Will this lead to reforms? That seems highly unlikely. One can simply assume that the regime will draw its own conclusions from this powerlessness, aside from a few repressive actions it won’t give up. But I don’t see any reforms emerging from this movement.
In 2018, during his first term in office, Donald Trump froze negotiations with Iran on the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). This year, the US President has resumed these talks. What are the main factors behind this U-turn, and how could this new approach influence the situation in the Middle East?
There are several factors at play in the current dynamic. Firstly, Donald Trump needs to secure a major deal. He had promised a quick deal with Russia, but that attempt ended in failure. Vladimir Putin very quickly understood the strategy of Trump, who have made all the concessions before even starting to negotiate. All he had to do was take these gestures for granted and then ask for more. Trump has thus trapped himself, with a failure visible to everyone, including his own public opinion and Congress. He therefore needs to find new ground for agreement. He has turned to China, but the results are mixed. Beijing has also realised that the American economy is suffering, as is the American consumer. This puts additional pressure on Trump, who is looking for a tangible success. It is in this context that he is trying something on the Iranian issue.
A second important factor is the position of Saudi Arabia, which is now making the reduction of regional tensions a priority. This is due to economic considerations. The Vision 2030 plan is facing difficulties such as a persistent budget deficit, mega-projects that are struggling to be financed, and accelerating the energy transition in the region. Mohammed bin Salman therefore has every interest in calming things down regionally. With this in mind, on 10 March 2023, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with Iran to ease tensions. Contrary to the expectations of some observers, this agreement has had concrete consequences. Bin Salman made it clear that he did not want strikes against Iran. In addition, in the autumn, a joint military exercise was organised between the two countries, followed by reciprocal high-level diplomatic visits, first by the Saudi Chief of Staff in Tehran, then by the Saudi Defence Minister. It has to be said that the Saudis have no illusions about Iran’s intentions, but they have identified a window of opportunity. For its part, Iran urgently needs to reduce tensions, both for its own security and to boost its economy. The two powers are therefore seeking to establish a modus vivendi, a form of a peaceful coexistence, without going so far as to talk of friendship.
This approach is completely at odds with the agenda of Benjamin Netanyahu, who recently reiterated his threats of strikes against Iran. Moreover, without abandoning his aggressive rhetoric against Iran, he has nonetheless indicated that he favours an agreement with Tehran, which brings him closer to the wishes of Riyadh, which prioritises de-escalation. For the American President, his proximity to Saudi Arabia, his regional pillar, is essential, which could help in the search for a compromise. This brings us to the heart of the nuclear issue, which has two components: the nuclear programme and sanctions.
On the nuclear programme, there are significant differences of opinion, but the technical solutions are known. They are documented, and several options are on the table. The Iranians have already shown a degree of flexibility. They have indicated, through various channels, that they are prepared to give up uranium enrichment to 60% and return to a level below 5%. They are also prepared to offer more guarantees to the IAEA, in particular by increasing inspections and monitoring. Another option being considered is the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, via a consortium in which Saudi Arabia could be involved. In short, let’s just say that solutions exist in this area.
The current negotiations have entered a more delicate phase. The changing positions of US officials have created a certain amount of confusion. The main negotiator, Steve Witkoff, who has no experience of diplomacy, had suggested that if Iran agreed to a number of conditions, including those just mentioned, it would be possible for it to continue enriching low-grade uranium for civilian purposes. However, Witkoff announced before the 5th round of negotiations that Washington was finally imposing a ban on all enrichment. The Iranian authorities immediately made it clear that this U-turn was unacceptable as uranium enrichment for civilian purposes is duly recognised by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has created a risk of dealing a fatal blow to the negotiations.
This change of position is curious. We know that there are different visions within Trump’s entourage, between the “hardliners” close to Netanyahu’s line and the pragmatists. This episode shows that the Israeli Prime Minister, who dreams of launching strikes against Iran, has stepped up the pressure on the White House. We know that differences also persist over where uranium should be reprocessed. These disagreements can be resolved, and the highly effective Omani diplomatic corps is actively involved in proposing solutions that could satisfy both parties.
On the other hand, there are still substantial obstacles to the lifting of sanctions. Surprisingly, there is little public discussion of this point, and this silence is in itself worrying. The Iranians are officially calling for a total lifting of sanctions, although they know that this is out of reach in the short term. But there is no indication of what Trump is prepared to offer in exchange for Iranian concessions. This lack of information reflects a certain lack of preparation on the American side. Trump had promised an agreement that would open up the Iranian market to American companies. The Iranians immediately responded favourably, saying they were ready to welcome these companies, including in the civil nuclear sector. But behind these announcements, the United States seems to be improvising.
Many questions remain unanswered: how much of the frozen funds will be released? Which funds are we talking about? Those frozen in South Korea? What channels would be used to access these funds? Would they be free to use or would they be conditional on certain types of purchase, such as agricultural goods or medicines? Nothing is mentioned. As far as opening up the Iranian market to American companies is concerned, Trump seems to have forgotten that he does not have the necessary levers at his disposal. US sanctions fall into two categories. Secondary sanctions, which target foreign companies, fall under Executive Orders that the President can suspend or cancel. Primary sanctions, on the other hand, which apply to American companies and citizens allegedly engaged in transactions with Iran, come under the jurisdiction of Congress, as they were adopted by legislative means. However, there is no indication that Congress is prepared to lift these sanctions.
The general impression is therefore one of great improvisation on the American side. Trump seems ill-prepared to deal with seasoned Iranian negotiators. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, knows the file inside out. He was one of the main negotiators of the 14 July 2015 agreement, alongside Mohammad Javad Zarif, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as his deputy and former colleague, Majid Takht-Ravanchi. They have mastered negotiating techniques, know how to formulate extreme demands and then converge on a reasonable compromise.
Moreover, it is also unlikely that major US companies would rush to invest in Iran, even if the primary sanctions were lifted. Would a board of directors consider setting up in a country controlled by the Revolutionary Guards? Not very likely. A more realistic scenario would be the granting of a special licence, as was the case under the JCPOA, for example to allow Boeing to deliver civil aircraft. This type of symbolic gesture could be the first test of a possible agreement.
On the Iranian side, preparations are much more concrete. A strong signal has been sent by the Supreme Leader, who has instructed the Discernment Council to release two texts requested by the FATF to enable Iran to leave its black list and join its grey list. One of these texts, the Palermo Convention (UNTOC — United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime), has just been approved by the Council. There is still a second convention to be approved, the Convention on Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). By taking this step, the Iranians are showing that they are seriously preparing for even a partial easing of sanctions. This gesture is all the more important given that many of the sanctions affect banking channels, in particular Swift messaging services. These are very concrete signals of Iranian willingness to negotiate.
And if these sanctions are indeed lifted and the Swift system becomes accessible to the Iranians again?
This will not be enough to restart international banking transactions. No international bank, other than American, if primary sanctions are lifted, will agree to do business with Iran until the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has given Tehran a minimum of respectability by removing it from the black list and placing it on the grey list. This change would be interpreted as a positive signal by the banks’ compliance departments, authorising them to consider transactions. But only if OFAC does not repeat what it did during the implementation of the JCPOA: exerting enormous pressure on European banks, to the point of terrorising them and dissuading them from honouring transactions that are perfectly legal under the nuclear agreement and the sanctions regime in force.
We are therefore in a phase where signals are certainly being sent out, but on the American side, apart from a few messages of the “I want an agreement quickly” type, I remain perplexed. I don’t see any precise indication of concrete preparations. They may be completely confidential — that’s a possibility I fully understand — but there’s no indication of what would actually happen if an agreement were to be reached tomorrow. And, for me, it is the key question. I’m very surprised by the total absence of comments on this subject, not only in the media, but also within think-tanks or among analysts: it’s a complete silence on what would happen on the day when…
I think there’s a fundamental problem here. It’s possible that the Americans have recently realised that they hadn’t really prepared for this eventuality.
In May 2025, a free trade agreement between Iran and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union came into force. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Tehran has remained a loyal ally of Moscow, supplying it with military equipment, including drones that are essential in modern armed conflicts. In January 2025, the two countries signed a strategic partnership agreement, which does not include a mutual defence clause. How would you explain the dynamics and challenges of relations between Russia and Iran?
This absence of clause is very revealing about the real scope of this so-called strategic agreement. We are talking here about the strategic partnership agreement between Iran and Russia, but the same applies to the agreement between Iran and China. The Iranians insist on the strategic nature of the agreement in their official discourse. But in reality, we need to make a clear diagnosis of these relations, because they are more tactical relations between partners who share certain interests, but who also have differences that can be significant and conflicting interests. They are forced to cooperate closely, largely because the West has done everything it can to push them towards each other. This means that, despite the partnership that binds them, and the enhanced cooperation, Moscow and Tehran, unsurprisingly, prioritise national interests.
With regard to Russia, more specifically, there is a heavy historical legacy that has never been forgotten in Iran — the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay, by which the Russian Empire annexed a large part of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, which became modern-day Azerbaijan. This memory feeds a long-standing and enduring mistrust. A good way of looking at it is never to forget that Iran, Russia and Turkey are the heirs of three historically rival empires, occasionally in armed conflict, sometimes partners, but always in competition. Their relationship remains ambivalent. They are obliged to be partners, while at the same time disagreeing on a given issue.
As far as Russia is concerned, it should be noted that under no circumstances does it want a nuclear-armed Iran. There is indeed a common Russian-Iranian front against the United States, but on the ground, notably in Syria, joint actions have coexisted with sharp differences. On the economic front, for example, the Russians and Iranians have found themselves in direct competition for control of key sectors, with the Russians gaining control of phosphates. In addition, during their joint support for Bashar al-Assad, serious tactical disagreements emerged.
A striking example of mistrust is the official position of Russia and China, which supported the United Arab Emirates in the territorial conflict opposing them to Iran over the islands of Abu Musa and the Lesser and Greater Tunbs. This position was extremely poorly received in Tehran.
These alliances are therefore alliances of necessity. Both sides seek to benefit from them within the limits imposed by their common confrontation with the West, which deprives them of funding and access to certain resources.
Another important point in Russian-Iranian relations is that the Iranians, in my view, made a major tactical error in delivering drones and providing military assistance to Russia in its war against Ukraine. In return, they hoped to obtain deliveries of Su-35 aircraft and the S-400 missile defence systems. But everyone knew that the Russians would never deliver the S-400s, considered to be their “crown jewels”. As for the Su-35s, for the past two years there have been regular announcements suggesting that they are “in the process of being delivered”, but they still haven’t arrived. It’s become a sort of Iranian version of Waiting for Godot. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict may explain some of the delays, but this is not the first time Moscow has acted in this way. The Russians get a lot from Iran, but they don’t give everything Tehran hopes for.
So, to answer the question precisely, there are structural reasons for this situation. The signs we are seeing show that trust between the two countries remains insufficient to allow for genuine strategic solidarity. What we see are tactical arrangements, based on coercion rather than a shared long-term vision.
On the other hand, can we say that if Iran manages to rid itself at least partially of Western sanctions, and if its relations with the United States, and more generally with the West, begin to improve, then this “tactical” alliance with Russia is likely to weaken? Is this a well-founded hypothesis?
So, I would say that the economic aspect of the alliance with Russia will be maintained because, unlike the Chinese — and this is a legend that needs to be deconstructed — it is the Russians who are really investing in Iran. The Chinese may sign agreements, but they don’t invest. But the Iranians have a crucial need to develop, in particular, the North-South rail corridor, and they are counting on the Russians to help them do that. Other Central Asian players are also involved: I saw that Kazakhstan has just invested in an Iranian port, and India is also attaching great importance to this project. So, the partnership is not going to disappear. Even in terms of defence, we can imagine that cooperation will continue, such as the transfer of equipment and access to technology, but it is clear that it will become less intense. It will not disappear, but it will diminish.
Everything will obviously depend on the extent of the benefits that Iran will derive from the lifting of sanctions. If these benefits are substantial, it will be a strong incentive for the Iranians to distance themselves from Russia – except as regards the North-South corridor, which I believe will remain a fundamental strategic interest in connecting Iran to Central Asia and the Gulf via Iraq. So, yes, we can expect a partnership that will lose some of its intensity, with perhaps certain aspects diminishing — notably a more limited Iranian military involvement, which will certainly be a key demand of the Americans in the context of the Ukraine issue. The Iranians will be forced to ease off, but certain aspects of the partnership, such as the one I have just mentioned, will remain.
Let’s turn now to Syria. Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Iran has lost much of its influence in the country. In addition, Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has proposed a deal to Donald Trump that would give US companies easier access to Syria’s oil fields. What do you think is the extent of Iran’s remaining influence in Syria, and what are the medium-term prospects?
It is fair to say that Iranian influence in Syria has suffered a fatal blow. To put it plainly, Iran is now marginalised. Firstly, because the Alawite government no longer exists — that’s the first point — and the current regime is clearly determined to eradicate the Iranian presence on its soil. Secondly, the Israeli strikes, while also having a negative effect on the new Syrian government, are largely aimed at preventing Iran and Hezbollah from returning to military sites that could threaten Israel’s security. I say “to a large extent”, because it now appears that Israel is wary of the new regime, despite the favourable reception given to Bashar al-Assad’s departure.
It seems to me that the pressure exerted by Israel on the new government is excessively heavy — to the point of risking creating a confrontational dynamic between the two. Mohamed al-Sharaa has said that he cannot afford to enter into conflict with Israel, given the imbalance of forces, but Israel, in my opinion, has made a major strategic error by invading another part of the Golan Heights. Officially, the aim of the operation was to strengthen its security and that of the Druze, threatened by more or less uncontrolled jihadist militias linked to the new Syrian regime, but in reality, an essential objective was to take control of the Golan’s water resources — a key strategic issue for Israel. By proceeding unilaterally and by force, Israel has introduced a factor of lasting conflict with the new Syrian regime.
In this logic of confrontation, Israel seems to be seeking to weaken the new regime, rather than engage in a logic of negotiation, compromise or even cooperation. And by acting in this way, the Jewish state is exposing itself to problems in the medium term. If this new regime were to be consolidated over the long term — which remains to be confirmed — it could seek to respond to the humiliation of this annexation, in particular because the issue of water is perceived as vital. For the moment, it can do nothing. But the seeds of a future conflict are well and truly planted.
In conclusion, Iran is now completely marginalised in Syria. It has lost access to Latakia, which was a strategic point for supplying Hezbollah with equipment and other resources. This weakening looks set to last, especially if Saudi Arabia and Turkey join forces to consolidate the power of the new masters of Damascus and if the United States decides to support its economic viability beyond the lifting of sanctions — which is not yet the case, but could become so.
This May, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) announced the cessation of all armed struggle and its dissolution, putting an end to more than 50 years of activity. What are the consequences of this decision for the countries in the region, in particular Turkey, Iraq and Syria?
To begin with Turkey, this development offers it the opportunity to put an end to armed confrontations that are costing it dearly, not only financially but also militarily. There are also electoral considerations for Erdogan, in a context of internal political crisis. By playing the appeasement card and reintegrating the Kurds into the political game, he hopes to gain some respite on the domestic front.
On the Iranian side, Tehran welcomed the decision and encouraged Turkey and the Kurds to move towards reconciliation. And why? Because Iran faces a major Kurdish problem. The Kurdish minority there has long been marginalised by a central power obsessed with a form of Persian supremacy and hostile to competing cultural identities. This prolonged repression has fuelled strong discontent. As a result, Kurdish Islamist groups emerged in Iranian Kurdistan, some of which carried out serious attacks in Iran, often in conjunction with Iraqi Islamist groups who provided them with logistical support. For Iran, a détente between the Kurds and Turkey could therefore help to mitigate certain cross-border security risks.
Turkey is also deriving another strategic benefit from this development, in the context of the corridors we mentioned earlier. It is benefiting from the Road Development Corridor project, a land corridor of considerable importance, designed to link Turkey to Iraq. This project is making real progress, unlike other corridors which are either making slow progress or are still uncertain or for the long term. An agreement was signed in 2023 between Turkey, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, with the latter two who will contribute to the financing. The American engineering firm Oliver Wyman, one of the largest in the world, has been appointed to manage the project. One of the prerequisites for the implementation of this strategic corridor is the pacification of the areas through which it will pass, in particular certain areas under Kurdish influence. If the PKK does indeed renounce the armed struggle, this will considerably facilitate the implementation of the project in a more secure environment. Turkey had imposed an agreement on Iraq to improve security in the area it crosses.
For Iraq, this is also excellent news, as it leads to a reduction in tensions in the Kurdish sector. It could even pave the way for improved relations between the central government and the regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan. The separatist tendencies of some Kurds could diminish if concrete economic development prospects materialise. This would benefit the entire country.
Finally, for Syria, this development also represents a relief for Mohamed al-Sharaa. He can hope that Syrian Kurds will accept a new modus vivendi. It should not be forgotten that under Bashar al-Assad, such an arrangement had already been found. The regime had withdrawn its troops from certain Kurdish areas in exchange for recognition of central authority by the Kurds, along with a degree of autonomy. Therefore, it is hoped that the current dynamic will also help ease the situation in Syria.
And, to summarise in a few words, this development is a determining factor in reducing tensions in the region.
Very recently, Donald Trump visited the Middle East, including three oil-rich monarchies: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). What were the objectives of this visit, and what were the results?
This is a timely question, as we have just published a report on this visit in Les Clés du Moyen-Orient, an online magazine. A report on this visit was recently published in Les Clés du Moyen-Orient, an online magazine. The visit had a number of objectives. Firstly, to remind the monarchies that the United States is not disengaging from the Middle East and the Gulf states. There was still some doubt, which needed to be cleared up.
Secondly, it was necessary to specify the nature of the military commitment, i.e. to give concrete expression to this commitment through major supplies of military equipment. This includes not only the delivery of equipment, such as super drones and missiles, but also training and maintenance, creating a lasting dependency. This relationship, based on supplies that create dependency, includes a major innovation. Allies must contribute financially to their own defence. For example, Qatar has agreed to finance the American base at Al Udeid to the tune of 10 billion dollars. This illustrates the new mode of relations in terms of security and defence.
As far as economic agreements are concerned, two priorities stand out. Firstly, the supply of aircraft, with massive orders for Boeing from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. However, it is important to note that the figures announced by Trump are often exaggerated. Negotiations for the sale of aircraft or equipment generally include offset or ‘local content’ clauses, which considerably reduce the final amount paid.
The second and more important aspect is the American desire to create a local artificial intelligence centre in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This involves colossal joint investments, with the transfer of cutting-edge technologies and co-investments to turn these countries into regional artificial intelligence hubs. In return, these countries will also invest in artificial intelligence in the United States, creating a major interdependence.
It is crucial to note that Trump has made numerous concessions to prevent these three countries from signing artificial intelligence agreements with Beijing. Beijing is currently negotiating with these countries, and Washington has made great sacrifices to block these agreements. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar took advantage of the situation to obtain major concessions, demonstrating their negotiating skills.
Finally, it is important to remain cautious as to whether these agreements actually materialise, as many contracts signed in the form of letters of intent do not always materialise. However, the trend is clear. There is a growing interdependence in the field of artificial intelligence between the United States and these countries.
