By Karam Dawli
For a long time, the issue of minorities has been one of the unspoken taboos—either suppressed by force or ignored through a form of collective pretense. It is difficult to identify a single, unified stance that represents minority perspectives regarding the concept of a citizenship-based state. Any meaningful discussion must begin from the realities on the ground, not from idealistic assumptions. In this context, the human rights dimension of citizenship emerges as the most critical factor.
Addressing Syria’s complex ethnic, religious, and cultural pluralism requires the urgent incorporation of international conventions on individual and collective rights into any future constitutional framework. It is, ultimately, the legal and constitutional structure that defines the degree of national integration and its potential viability within any state.
Introduction
The topic is deeply complex and emotionally charged, especially in this troubled region. Its multi-layered nature makes it difficult to fully grasp due to its entanglement with questions of identity and historical narratives. For decades, the issue of minorities has remained deliberately silenced, often associated—rightly or wrongly—with accusations of separatism, disloyalty, or regression. As such, it has become a sensitive topic that has yet to be sufficiently addressed through open dialogue, academic research, or intellectual inquiry—both in Syria and across the wider region.
Key Points Related to the Study’s Theme
The term “minority” here refers to the numerical description of specific groups—ethnic, religious, or sectarian—defined by primary identities acquired by birth. Its usage is not intended to diminish their significance, value, or historical presence. All nationalities, faiths, and sects in Syria are foundational elements of the modern Syrian state—at least since its establishment in 1920—and constitute essential components of Syria’s cultural, spiritual, social, and economic fabric. The term “minority” simply reflects their smaller population size in biological terms. Moreover, the term has acquired recognized legal, political, and social meaning through international frameworks, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments. While some constitutions opt for terms like “small nationalities” to denote ethnic minorities, the legal concept remains widely acknowledged.
Minority groups in Syria, as defined above, do not represent a single, unified political bloc. Instead, they encompass a broad spectrum of ideological positions, often mirroring the entire national political landscape—beyond the boundaries of identity alone. Consequently, no singular position can be said to represent “the minorities” on the issue of citizenship and the nation-state. What is presented in this paper reflects only one political vision among many in Syria’s complex scene, specifically that of the Assyrian Democratic Organization, whose principles I adopt as a member.
In articulating a vision for a desired citizenship-based state, we must not overlook the realities of Syrian history—particularly regarding the experiences of minority communities. Nor can we ignore the identity conflicts currently manifesting as deep ruptures in the country’s social fabric, the widening gap between communities, growing fear of the “other,” and the fragility of national unity. The minority question and the challenge of ethnic and religious diversity are not recent phenomena, but deeply rooted in Syria’s historical journey—especially evident over the past century marked by repeated failures to establish a truly democratic nation-state. Any attempt to address this issue must start from the current realities—not from an idealized version of them—as part of a responsible effort to manage diversity through a national path that may eventually foster a cohesive identity, reconciled with its past, present, and future.
When speaking of justice, equality, citizenship, freedom, and human dignity, we must remember that an individual belonging to a minority group—referred to here, symbolically, as the “minority individual”—did not choose their ethnic identity or religious belief. Therefore, understanding the minority mindset, with its common behaviors, concerns, and, at times, traumas or sociopolitical pathologies, requires a broader contextualization. These patterns are not solely the product of minority experience but emerge from a historically complex interplay with the attitudes and behaviors of majority populations. Thus, addressing the issue of minorities and Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity—viewed as a national issue—is not the responsibility of minorities alone. It is a shared national duty, requiring collective commitment from all Syrians.
A Look at the Concept of Citizenship
At its core, citizenship is a legal and social relationship—between individuals within a society, and between those individuals and the governing authority. Yet citizenship is not a self-sufficient system of principles, rights, and values capable of always meeting the demands of justice—whether in legal terms, in political and developmental participation, or in the symbolic realm of belonging and national identity.
For example, according to the Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic, all holders of Syrian nationality are considered citizens. Thus, citizenship cannot be denied to a Syrian Christian, for instance. However, the degree and quality of that citizenship is where the real issue lies.
This brings us to a fundamental point: the legal and rights-based content of citizenship is its most decisive element. A citizen is not to be defined by their profession, religion, gender, or ethnicity—but legally and socially as a citizen: a member of society with full rights and responsibilities. Full citizenship, therefore, demands absolute equality—before the law, in rights, and in duties.
Citizenship and Human Rights
Modern human society has developed a value-based and legal framework that now serves as a global standard for evaluating freedom, equality, and basic rights. Accordingly, the envisioned Syrian state must align its concept of citizenship—with both its ethical content and legal mechanisms—with international human rights frameworks.
Given the intrinsic link between citizenship and human rights, the struggle for genuine citizenship is inherently a struggle for the realization of human rights, as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the core international instruments that followed—particularly the 1966 International Covenants and the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.
What applies to individual rights must also apply to collective rights. This principle is affirmed in various international treaties, particularly those protecting the rights of minority groups and indigenous peoples, emphasizing the importance of safeguarding group identities—especially in states characterized by ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic diversity.
In this light, the adoption of international conventions on individual and group rights—enshrining them not as symbolic or superficial additions, but as foundational pillars within any future Syrian constitution—is a vital step toward resolving the deeply rooted issues of pluralism in Syria. Such a resolution must be democratic, inclusive, and just—anchored in the unity of Syria’s land and people.
Based on these principles—which are global in nature and widely echoed in Syrian political discourse—it is evident that the values and rights discussed here must form the very foundation of any modern national state that aspires to belong to the spirit of the times.
This leads us to a central question:
What kind of state—and what kind of citizenship—do we seek to build?
Does the Concept of a Citizenship-Based State—As Currently Debated in Syria—Truly Reflect the Essence of Citizenship?
While many Syrians have, over the past decade, reached consensus on key democratic principles through various political conferences and coalitions, significant challenges remain—particularly in areas where visions for the desired state diverge. This study focuses not on the agreed-upon foundations, but on the still-contentious issues, namely: national identity, the civil-versus-secular state debate, the role of religion in governance, and the scope of rights—whether they should apply solely to individuals or to both individuals and groups.
I. Individual and Group Rights / Questions of Identity and Integration
The constitutional and legal framework of a state defines the extent and feasibility of national integration. When grounded in justice, equality, mutual respect, and full citizenship, such a framework can ensure true inclusion and cohesion in a modern political system. A constitution that explicitly acknowledges the rights of national or ethnic communities reflects the commitment of a contemporary state to protect the collective cultural and political rights of minorities—as stipulated in international human rights conventions. This constitutional recognition is not a deviation from the principle of equal citizenship, but its natural complement. It is also a vital safeguard against the risks of societal fragmentation in Syria’s future.
In a pluralistic society—ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse—the state must avoid aligning itself with any one ethnicity or religious group. It must categorically reject exclusivist policies, the imposition of a singular identity, or the marginalization of minority communities. Instead, it must affirm the equal political participation of all citizens, allowing them to maintain their cultural, ethnic, or religious identities without fear of repression or denial.
To uphold Syria as a final and shared homeland for all its people, national cohesion must be actively rebuilt. This includes revitalizing the weakened sense of Syrian national unity and constructing a modern national identity that embraces the country’s rich diversity. Such an identity must rise above sectarian, ethnic, or regional divides and turn diversity into a source of national strength—rather than a cause of fragmentation.
This requires a collective rejection of extremism, bigotry, and supremacist ideologies—whether ethnic or religious—and the promotion of a civic culture rooted in citizenship, moderation, tolerance, and dialogue. Dialogue must become the primary mode of engagement among Syria’s various social, political, and intellectual currents. Political forces—whether nationalist or religious—must also adopt a more pragmatic approach, moving beyond idealistic or nostalgic projects that would reduce Syria to a mere province in a mythical empire. Instead, they must dedicate themselves to building a modern, democratic state that ensures prosperity, stability, and meaningful participation, and that is capable of constructive engagement within the region and the broader international community.
Merely asserting the existence of a unified Syrian people and identity—as if they are fixed and fully realized—risks becoming an exercise in elitist wishful thinking. This narrative fails to acknowledge Syria’s historically fraught identity trajectory. Present realities reveal a lack of the structural and cultural conditions needed for forging a new, cohesive national identity. And while the aspiration to such an identity remains legitimate and worthy of pursuit, it must not become a cover for the continued dominance of one group over public life, repackaged in the language of unity.
True national reconciliation can only begin with a constitutional commitment to recognizing Syria as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state. This means formally acknowledging the national, cultural, and linguistic rights of all its communities, and ensuring that these rights are reflected in the state’s symbols—its name, flag, institutions, media, educational system, and official language policies. A Syrian identity at peace with its historical and cultural legacy must emerge free from ideological distortion—an identity that honors all civilizational contributions that have shaped the country’s trajectory.
This would also require a constitutional definition of the Syrian people that recognizes its composite ethnic makeup and guarantees these communities not only their cultural rights but also their role in shaping national decisions—without resorting to quota-based power-sharing. Creative legislative and administrative mechanisms are needed. One such mechanism could involve a bicameral parliamentary system, with the second chamber representing minority communities. In this model, constitutional amendments that affect minority rights and freedoms would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers, ensuring that minority voices play a central role in shaping national legislation.
On the executive level, Syria must explore and positively engage with modern governance models—foremost among them, federalism. A federal system offers a path beyond the rigid centralism that has, for decades, fueled authoritarianism and monopolized public life. It would enable fair power-sharing, equitable resource distribution, enhanced democratic participation, and balanced regional development across the country. Crucially, any transition toward such a system must take place within an environment of stability and ensure that all Syrians can freely express their will and aspirations.
II. The Desired Political System: Between the Civil and Secular State
In the Syrian political discourse today, most opposition forces and active movements have adopted the term “civil state” as a way of circumventing or softening the concept of secularism—largely to appease certain Islamic factions, some of which equate secularism with atheism or disbelief. However, these groups have largely failed to clearly define what a civil state entails. Islamic political actors, in particular, have offered vague or contradictory interpretations of the term. Some have portrayed it as a continuation of the Prophet’s governance in Medina, using it as a historical reference point. Others define it simply as a state not ruled by clerics or the military. Still others describe it as a state that respects all divine religions, where non-Muslims are not compelled to follow the majority’s religious laws. Another definition offers it as a state for all citizens—yet denies leadership roles for non-Muslims over Muslims, or for women over men.
These conflicting interpretations have only added to the ambiguity surrounding the term “civil state,” especially from the perspective of religious minorities, many of whom view such ambiguity as reinforcing legal and social inequality. When a political system fails to guarantee equal rights across religious and gender lines, it undermines the principles of citizenship and threatens societal cohesion.
A Clear Vision of the Modern Civil Democratic State
Our understanding of the modern civil democratic state begins with its sovereignty and independence. It is a constitutional state built on a consensual, secular legal foundation—shaped collaboratively by all national and political forces. It is a state that transcends ethnic, religious, and sectarian identities, and belongs equally to all its citizens, regardless of background. It is not an instrument of any one religion, sect, ethnicity, ideology, or political party.
Such a state respects all religious beliefs without granting them political privileges. It is grounded in equal rights and duties, in full and equal citizenship, and in the separation of religion from both politics and the state. Sovereignty belongs to the people, the rule of law is supreme, and democratic governance is realized through the peaceful transfer of power via fair elections.
In this framework, there is no contradiction between the concepts of the civil state and _secularism_—they are, in fact, deeply aligned. Replacing “secularism” with “civility” serves only to obscure the necessary commitments that secular governance entails. It risks masking intentions to preserve religious or ideological dominance under a more palatable label.
We argue that secularism and democracy are inseparable: one cannot thrive without the other. A secular democratic system guarantees broad freedoms for all faiths, prevents religious discrimination, protects minorities and women, and shields public life from the instrumentalization of religion by political or ruling forces. We do not view secularism as a belief system or ideology; it is not hostile to religion, nor does it undermine its sanctity. Rather, it seeks to establish a respectful and neutral space between religion and the state.
Secularism ensures that the state remains equidistant from all religions, while safeguarding every individual’s right to freely practice their faith, rituals, and beliefs—free from state or societal coercion. It is not an atheistic philosophy; rather, it is a set of principles and safeguards that guarantee freedom of conscience, belief, and expression.
Importantly, secularism does not offer a one-size-fits-all legal model. It adapts to each society’s culture, identity, and historical experience. Its successful application in diverse countries—from Western nations to India, Japan, Malaysia, and Turkey—demonstrates its flexibility and universality. These countries represent a wide range of religious traditions, and yet they have all benefited from the secular principle of keeping religion separate from political power.
Regardless of its Western origin, secularism has emerged as a universal value—transcending continents, races, and creeds. Its proven effectiveness in securing freedoms and enabling peaceful coexistence makes it highly applicable in any context where liberty, pluralism, and the public good are paramount.
