In light of recent US-Iran talks hosted by Oman and broader developments in the Middle East, we spoke with Dr. Ariel Admoni, an expert on Qatar’s foreign and domestic affairs, to gain a better understanding of the foreign policy, internal dynamics, and regional impact of this small but wealthy and ambitious Gulf state.
The talks between the US Special Presidential Envoy Steven Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Oman regarding normalization were described as “positive and constructive” by the White House. The Qatari Foreign Ministry has also issued a statement welcoming the US-Iran talks. Could you describe in detail Doha’s foreign policy regarding Iran and its approach towards normalisation with Washington?
When we examine the Qatari position towards Iran, we found that, unlike most other Gulf states that most of the time, or let’s say since the Iranian revolution, Qatar has faced a persistent dilemma. Since the 1990s, we saw that Qatar wanted to distinguish itself from other Gulf neighbors in its approach to Tehran.
Already in the 1980s, even when there was a disaster in Mecca involving Iranian pilgrims, most Gulf states took a strong stance against Iran, while Qatar was more moderate in its approach. And from the 1990s, under the leadership of the then-Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Qatar entered a transformative age. But the country’s approach to Iran was not entirely new but rather a continuation of an earlier strategy aimed at maintaining a balance between old allies.
In 1990, then-Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani stated, “We are proud that we can talk both with Israel and Iran at the same time. This is what makes us special”. And for that purpose, I can say that even in the last 20 years, when there was tension between Riyadh and Tehran, Qatar tried to preserve a balancing act.
This balancing approach was especially evident during the Gulf crisis in 2017, when one of the key demands placed on Doha was to severe ties with Tehran. Instead, Qatar partially relied on the Iranian economy to navigate the blockade and maintain stability.
However, and here comes the crucial point, when the entire Gulf region chose a more reconciliatory manner, for instance, the fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia reached certain agreements, I think that Qatar _found itself in a difficult position. Because its distinctiveness was threatened, as its strategy of being the “bridge” or “unique mediator” became less relevant.
For that reason, some tensions, even though not substantial, emerged between Tehran and Doha. Iran has continued to push Qatar to invest more in its economy and to deepen bilateral ties, but Qatar has remained cautious.
Qatar continued its balancing act and during the Biden administration, they actually succeeded in being the mediator, particularly in discussions around a renewed nuclear deal. And I think the Qataris hoped that would happen as well under the Trump administration, but that never materialized.
But the reason it failed is that in this delicate balance, Qatar chose the Washington over Tehran. The fact that Khamenei publicly criticized Qatar in his _tweet for agreeing to transfer the $6 billion in frozen funds on behalf of the United States was a deal breaker for Tehran. For Tehran, Qatar was not an honest mediator, since it was more aligned with Washington than with the Iranians.
For that reason, the endorsing message by Doha regarding Oman hosting the US-Iran talks is an example of Qatar trying to make the best of the situation. The truth is that they were frustrated that Oman was chosen as a mediator, but they hoped that by showing good faith and a supportive stance, they would be able to put their foot in the door again, despite the fact that under the current administration in Tehran, there are some cracks.
The US-Qatar relations remain strong, built on over 50 years of cooperation in political, economic, security, and cultural domains. After the arrival of Donald Trump to the White House and the new dynamics emanating from Washington shook many European leaders. How was it felt in Qatar? Do we observe shifts in bilateral dynamics?
First of all I would like to stress that the ties between Qatar and the United States are currently very strong, but also quite asymmetrical. We see Qatari cooperation with the US at the highest levels. There even have been praises from Trump himself, from within his inner circle, and from major corporate CEOs. Cooperation extends even to sub-federal levels.
Just yesterday, there was an announcement about a signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between Qatar’s Interior Ministry and Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). There is also significant cooperation with cities like Houston and states such as North Carolina, as well as investments in Oklahoma. This is a crucial factor because Qatar wants to present itself, especially to Trump, as pro-business, pro-security, and aligned with the goals he sees as important.
When we talk about the new dynamic, this is a critical point for Qatar. The Trump administration has proven far less predictable than Biden’s. In fact, many global actors have distanced themselves due to this instability. Historically, Trump’s stance toward Qatar in particular shifted dramatically, for instance in 2017, he was very anti-Qatar, and by the following year, very pro-Qatar.
Because of this unpredictability, Qatar remains cautious but engaged. They don’t know what Trump might do next, so they have tried, both before and especially after his inauguration, to position themselves as viable and useful partner in a range of sectors. They’ve tried to highlight their role in negotiations and maintain cordial relationships with most of Trump’s circle.
And this includes financial ties. We have to remember the business connections between Qatar and figures like Steven Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and companies such as Tesla and Starlink. For this reason, Qatar is currently perceived in both the White House and Congress as a partner worth keeping. The Qataris are trying to preserve good relations with both Republicans and Democrats, because they do not want to anger the United States.
Moreover, Qatar’s posture toward supporting armed groups or terrorist movements has varied depending on the administration. Under Biden, it was easier for them to act more openly. But during the Trump administration, they were more ambivalent. While they still provided some support, unfortunately, they often waited for a green light from Washington to transfer legitimate aid.
Under Trump, unlike during the Biden administration, they were more cautious, acting to a lesser extent and ensuring they were well-positioned in Washington before taking any steps that might provoke the American president. In the case of Syria, for example, they waited for US approval before transferring funds
And if we compare cooperation with Biden administration and now with the US under Trump, do you see any intensification of cooperation it remain more or less on the same level?
I’d say it is more or less the same. I think the fact that Qatar knew how to expand its footprint for the last 20-30 years in the US, Doha knew very quickly how to use the exploit the current situation to actually expand their ties. So, if we see more volume of trade or investment, it’s not because the Republicans or the Democrats rule the US, but because Qataris are positioned very well over there.
Following Qatar’s recent humanitarian support and high-level visits to Sudan, such as Minister Mariam bint Nasser Al-Misnad’s trip to Port Sudan in April 2025, how is the Emirate using its neutral position to help put an end to the ongoing conflict ravaging this African country?
When we examine Qatari foreign policy in general, and Sudan being a particularly good example, we need to distinguish between the public relations perspective and the actual policy objectives. From a public relations standpoint, Qatar has been very eager to promote a hard stance in international organizations, especially at the UN and its various agencies. They have sought to present themselves as humanitarian actors capable of coordinating responses to crises like the one in Sudan, including transferring funds and delivering financial assistance.
For instance, the use of the same mediators in multiple contexts can be seen not just as diplomacy but as business. In this sense, Qatar’s humanitarian campaigns serve as a strategic tool to expand influence. Control or access to infrastructure _such as ports and international airports is a recurring pattern in countries where Qatar gets involved. These assets are often targets of Qatari interest under the guise of humanitarian or development cooperation.
Therefore, when Qatar portrays itself as a positive and neutral actor in Sudan, we should take a closer look. In many cases where Qatar claims to be acting on humanitarian grounds, this façade allows them to communicate with all parties involved. That positioning as a negotiator or mediator is efficient, but it is also instrumental. In reality, this mediating role is often aimed at achieving financial, political, or geopolitical gains.
We should also scrutinize Qatar’s relationship with the opposition forces in Sudan. I must admit, I’m not an expert on Sudanese politics, but _if experts were to examine Qatar’s stance toward the Sudanese opposition, I think they would find that Qatar, from a PR perspective, aims to present itself as pro-peace and pro-negotiation in a way that aligns with Western preferences.
However, in practice, much like we’ve seen in other conflict zones such as Russia-Ukraine war, Qatar often supports both sides. This dual engagement reflects a strategy where Sudan is not a strategic target in itself but rather a pawn in a broader geopolitical game.
Let’s shift to Qatar’s role as a mediator, the role that is well known beyond the region. For instance, Doha helped to organize the exchange of prisoners of war between Ukraine and Russia. In light of current diplomatic efforts steered by the US, what role does the Qatari leadership reserve with regard to this conflict?
I think that Trump taking the Oval Office placed Qatar in a very delicate situation. As we mentioned before, there was a good relationship between the Trump administration and Qatar, but Qatar had to tread lightly because Trump’s actions were often unpredictable.
For that reason, during the final months of First Trump administration, Qatar tried to position itself in various international conflicts in a way that would be acceptable to all sides, since they couldn’t anticipate Trump’s stance. For example, they sought to establish themselves as mediators with the Taliban, helping facilitate the release of American hostages.
In a similar manner, we saw Qatar navigating today’s Trump administration approach to the Russia-Ukraine war. Interestingly, both Zelensky and Putin met with the Emir of Qatar and expressed appreciation, because Qatar managed to balance relations with both actors. One report mentioned Qatar acting as a negotiator in efforts to rescue the Ukrainian children, while at the same time providing assistance to Russia in the energy sector and, according to some sources, even supplying weapons to Ukraine.
So, when Trump was in office again, Qatar understood that this was not an administration they could afford to misread. Unlike with the Biden administration, where portraying oneself as pro-Ukraine clearly aligned with US policy, under Trump, Qatar couldn’t be sure what would be perceived positively.
That’s why Qatar chose a more neutral approach. They tried to frame their actions as purely humanitarian, talking about assistance, exchanges of captives, and general efforts to reduce suffering, while avoiding any bold political alignment. They maintained a low-key attitude, focusing mainly on universally acceptable goals such as prisoner exchanges or calls for an end to the war, in other words positions that would be broadly supported regardless of Washington’s stance.
With Qatar mediating in the Gaza conflict and hosting Hamas leaders, how is Doha maintaining its role as an impartial player while navigating complex relationships with other Gulf countries and Israel in the changing Middle East of 2025?
As we _mentioned before, Qatar’s use of a humanitarian façade has been a very effective tool to position itself on various fronts. Take Gaza, for example, and also what they call _the West Bank. We’ve seen Qatar’s ongoing ties to Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Qatar has continued to fund them openly and proudly. Since the 2025 ceasefire, Qatar entered into the field quite aggressively. We know that equipment and fuel provided under humanitarian pretenses were later used in Hamas operations.
The “humanitarian angle” has been a strategic instrument for Qatar to increase its influence. Fuel, for instance, was not only transferred to Gaza but also to Lebanon. Just yesterday, the Qatari Fund for Development announced its second shipment this year amounting to hundreds of tons, sent to Lebanon. Similarly, in Syria, Qatar supported the delivery of equipment and gas.
With Doha, it’s a consistent pattern: while proclaiming itself a humanitarian actor, Qatar has mastered the art of using aid as a geopolitical tool. For example, just after Qatar announced its entry into the Burdur refugee zone, Sheikha Moza’s “Education Above All” _foundation announced the opening of an educational institution in Gaza, called Al-Fakhoura. At the same time, Qatar’s Education Minister, Lolwah bint Rashid Al-Khater, visited Beirut to discuss education cooperation between Lebanon and Qatar. These moves, presented as purely humanitarian, are deeply embedded in a broader political agenda.
When analyzing Qatar as a geopolitical actor, we must also consider its involvement in energy, education, resettlement, and yes, also terrorism. Over the last decade, Qatar has transferred funds under the banner of humanitarian aid, but in reality, those funds and resources have often been funneled to subversive and terrorist movements. This includes both money and, in some cases, weapons.
Qatar is not a neutral actor. During the current war, Qatar has been vocally critical of every Israeli action, while simultaneously showing explicit or implicit support for organizations such as Hamas, and at times, even Hezbollah, both of which are designated as terrorist organizations by the United States and the European Union.
And the last question to wrap up our conversation. From the Qataris’ standpoint, what actually are the current most pressing foreign and domestic issues for Qatar?
We often forget that Qatar is a tiny state, and as such, it is acutely aware of its delicate position in global affairs. For that reason, Qatar’s leadership, including its intelligence services, has long pursued a balancing act between major global powers. Qatar seeks to preserve its ties with China while simultaneously maintaining strong relationships with the West.
As we’ve discussed today, there are multiple examples of this dual-track diplomacy. In Sudan, Qatar maintained ties with both the legitimate government and subversive organizations. We’ve seen a similar approach in the context of the Russia–Ukraine war. But unlike some other small states that merely try to be “friends with everyone”, Qatar goes a step further. It aims to ensure that every actor has not only a reason to cooperate with Qatar, but also, in some cases, a reason to be cautious.
This may sound exaggerated, but part of Qatar’s leverage lies in its strategic use of media, investments, and, at times, its ties with subversive movements. This strategy ensures that Qatar remains influential while also deterring other states from challenging it too directly.
_This mindset _born of insecurity also manifests internally. Over the past year, the Qatari leadership has taken steps to consolidate power domestically. We’ve seen the ruling family extend its control over ministries, sports clubs, and other institutions, sometimes replacing figures from other influential Qatari families, such as Al-Attiyah, with its own loyalists.
Similarly, the last two years have seen what could be described as a crackdown on foreign workers. Reports have emerged of arrests targeting Indian IT professionals, Filipino workers, and notably, the detention of eight Indian military veterans serving in Qatar. These actions reflect a broader tightening of control within the Emirate.
This domestic consolidation has also had political consequences. Qatar cancelled its limited elections for the Advisory Council — not a body with true legislative power, but a symbolic step toward participation. Even these modest elections, reserved only for Qatari citizens, were halted. This reflects the regime’s growing concern with maintaining internal stability in an increasingly unstable international environment.
To sum up, Qatar is navigating a global stage marked by unpredictability by continuing its policy of balancing global powers, leveraging its unique assets to maintain influence, and simultaneously tightening control over domestic affairs. This dual-track strategy, external flexibility and internal rigidity, has served Qatar well for the past three decades, but it remains to be seen how sustainable it will be in the current global context.
