By: Yasser Hassoun
Summary
This article explores the dangers of ideological rigidity and the critical importance of accepting opposing viewpoints. It draws a parallel between psychological entrapment and political intransigence by using the historical example of Abu Lahab—the Prophet Muhammad’s uncle—and his antagonism toward Islam. It further draws a modern analogy with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Syria’s controversial diplomacy, and more recently, with Iran’s current conflict with Israel.
The key argument is this: when an individual or state moves too far down a path of antagonism, they may cross a psychological threshold known as the point of no return, after which backing down becomes psychologically, socially, or politically impossible.
Introduction
A friend once posed a compelling question: What would have happened if Abu Lahab had embraced Islam after the revelation of Surah Al-Masad? Would the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ have revoked that Surah? Or would another verse have been revealed to annul it?
Surah Al-Masad cursed Abu Lahab and his wife while they were still alive: “Perish the hands of Abu Lahab, and perish he! His wealth and gains shall not avail him. He will burn in a blazing flame. And his wife—the carrier of firewood—around her neck is a rope of twisted fiber.” (Qur’an, 111:1–5)
Some argue that had Abu Lahab converted, this revelation would have undermined the Prophet’s credibility. Others justify it by invoking fatalistic interpretations of divine decree—arguing that Abu Lahab was destined to disbelieve. But that view renders accountability meaningless.
Those who deny the divine origin of the Qur’an suggest this Surah was simply a propaganda tool crafted by Muhammad ﷺ against one of his most vocal enemies. Yet neither of these extremes suffices. This article investigates the issue with a broader lens.
Who Was Abu Lahab?
Abu Lahab, born ʿAbd al-ʿUzzā ibn ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib, was the Prophet’s uncle. He earned the nickname Abu Lahab (“Father of Flame”) due to his bright, glowing complexion. He was known for his hostility toward Muhammad ﷺ—ridiculing him, spreading filth at his doorstep, and slandering him in public. As Ibn al-Athir writes, Abu Lahab was a persistent tormentor who died in Mecca upon hearing of the Quraysh defeat at the Battle of Badr (2 AH), from a contagious disease called al-ʿAdasa.¹
The Context of Surah Al-Masad
According to early sources, Surah Al-Masad was revealed in the fourth year of Muhammad’s prophetic mission. One widely cited narration recounts the Prophet ascending Mount Safa and calling the Quraysh to heed his warning of divine punishment. When asked if they would believe him if an enemy was approaching, they affirmed. Upon declaring his divine mission, Abu Lahab scoffed: “Is this why you gathered us? May you perish!”²
Abu Lahab was known to trail Muhammad ﷺ as he preached, attempting to discredit him and accusing him of promoting heresy. As narrated by Rabiʿah ibn ʿAbad al-Daylī, Abu Lahab followed him from tribe to tribe, telling people: “He wants you to abandon your gods for a dangerous innovation. Don’t listen to him.”
The Hostility of Abu Lahab and His Wife
Abu Lahab fought the Prophet ﷺ using all means available—including economic sabotage. He pressured traders to raise prices on goods purchased by the Prophet’s followers, offering to cover their losses.³ His wife, Umm Jamil (Arwā bint Harb), was equally hostile—mocking and insulting the Prophet and his companions. She was known for spreading thorny branches where he walked and composed verses to ridicule him: “We disobeyed the cursed one, rejected his words, and detested his religion.”
A Psychological Perspective: The Point of No Return
From a psychological standpoint, Abu Lahab and his wife had committed themselves so deeply to enmity that retraction became impossible. They had reached what psychologist Sir Frederic Bartlett termed in his 1958 book Thinking as the point of no return—“the moment at which an individual becomes so committed to a certain course of action that reversal is no longer an option.”⁴
Hafiz al-Assad’s Letter to Saddam Hussein
A revealing example of this concept emerged in the late 20th century, when Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad sent an open letter to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein urging him to withdraw from Kuwait. The letter shocked observers due to its conciliatory tone between two longtime adversaries, notorious for plotting against each other.
The letter, dated January 12, 1991, just days before Operation Desert Storm, was read across Syrian media. Assad wrote: “With sincere fraternal feelings… I urge you to withdraw for the sake of Arab unity and peace.”⁵ To those familiar with their bitter rivalry, the words seemed absurd—evoking more laughter than credibility.
Analyzing Assad’s Sudden ‘Brotherhood’
Several observations clarify the real motives:
- The letter coincided precisely with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s brief visit to Damascus on the same day.
- The message aired immediately after Baker’s departure.
- It was broadcast just five days before the UN-imposed deadline (January 17, 1991) for Iraq to withdraw or face military action.⁶
Assad’s letter was not a genuine peace gesture—it was a calculated move to justify Syria’s alliance with the U.S.-led coalition.
The West’s Strategy to Corner Saddam
Western governments, particularly the U.S., seemingly preferred pushing Saddam beyond the point of no return rather than seeking a peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait. UN Resolution 678, issued on November 29, 1990, authorized “all necessary means” to force Iraq out of Kuwait by January 15, 1991.⁷ The ultimatum’s tone was deliberately confrontational.
President George H.W. Bush’s letter to Saddam further escalated tensions. Described by some as “insulting,” it warned: “You began this war with your invasion. It will end only with your full and unconditional compliance.”⁸
These provocations made it nearly impossible for Saddam to back down without losing face.
Was Escalation the Real Goal?
All evidence suggests that the U.S. and its allies sought not merely to liberate Kuwait, but to cripple Iraq’s infrastructure and power. The provocative language and impossible demands were designed to leave Saddam with no acceptable exit strategy—ultimately destroying Iraq’s military, economy, and civil institutions.
This was highlighted by the resignation of French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who protested the mission’s expansion from liberation to destruction.⁹
The Illusion of Diplomacy
Assad’s letter was never meant to persuade Saddam—it was political theater. It gave Assad cover to join the Western coalition while maintaining his “Arab nationalist” facade. In truth, the U.S. had already concluded that Saddam had crossed the point of no return.
Will Iran Retreat Today?
The same pattern may now be unfolding with Iran. Western and Israeli officials publicly downplayed the possibility of military action. President Biden even avoided referencing peace with Israel during his Saudi forum speech—raising hopes among Iranian officials.
But suddenly, airstrikes began on Iranian military sites. When Iran retaliated, the U.S. responded with threats: “Return to negotiations, or the days ahead will be harsher.” Some rhetoric even targeted Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei personally—turning the conflict into a personal vendetta and leaving Iran’s leadership with little room to maneuver.
Thus, like Abu Lahab or Saddam Hussein, Iran’s regime risks being pushed into a corner—unable to retreat without losing legitimacy.
Revisiting the Question: What If Abu Lahab Had Converted?
During a visit to the late Syrian thinker Dr. Muhammad Shahrour, I raised the same question: What if Abu Lahab had embraced Islam after Surah Al-Masad?
He leaned in and whispered: “The Americans waited five months before allowing Assad to send that letter to Saddam—only after ensuring he had passed the point of no return. Don’t you think Abu Lahab, after four years of bitter opposition, had reached the same point?”
Conclusion
Rigid thinking and ideological extremism often prevent individuals and nations from revising their course—even in the face of looming disaster. Crossing the point of no return becomes not only a psychological trap, but a political death sentence.
The solution lies in embracing pluralism, accepting dissent, and understanding that diversity on earth reflects the oneness of God in heaven. As the Prophet reportedly said: “Cleanliness is part of faith.” By analogy, perhaps pluralism too is part of faith.
- Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh; al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk (Year 2 AH).
- Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Book of Tafsīr.
- See: al-Zurqānī, Sharḥ al-Mawāhib al-Ladunniyyah.4. Frederic Bartlett, Thinking, 1958.
- Official transcript of Assad’s speech, Syrian News Agency Archives (January 1991).
- UN Security Council Resolution 678, November 29, 1990.
- Ibid.
- George H. W. Bush, letter to Saddam Hussein, January 1991.
- Le Monde, “Chevènement démissionne,” January 1991.
