By Ahmad Al-Remeh
Summary
The newly uncovered “Qevir Plan”—a revamped version of Iran’s nuclear project—signals a strategic evolution in the regime’s methods, which now rely heavily on blending military and civilian activities to evade international scrutiny. According to the latest reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), along with four separate press conferences held by Iranian opposition figures over the past six months, Iran has significantly intensified its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon—posing a grave threat to regional stability and undermining global non-proliferation frameworks.
Introduction
On June 10, 2025, the Iranian opposition—represented by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)—unveiled detailed intelligence regarding a covert nuclear weapons program known as the “Qevir Plan.”
The plan is a continuation and escalation of the former “Amad Project,” but with increased secrecy and complexity. It reflects the Iranian regime’s determination to pursue military nuclear capabilities despite mounting international pressure. The information is drawn from the opposition group MEK’s internal network inside Iran and corroborated by recent IAEA assessments.
Historical Background and Evolution of the Nuclear Program
Iran’s ambition to acquire military nuclear capability intensified in the late 1990s. In 1999, the regime initiated the “Amad Project,” aimed at producing five nuclear warheads to be mounted on Shahab-3 missiles. The project was conducted through close coordination between the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Ministry of Defense, with hundreds of experts transferred to military facilities.
However, in 2003, the opposition exposed the Lavizan-Shian site, forcing the regime to suspend and restructure its nuclear activities. While operations were officially halted, the regime retained both the infrastructure and the scientific talent pool, relocating many of them to other clandestine locations.
According to sources within the opposition, in 2009 Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued direct orders to resume and expand the nuclear weapons program under a new banner: the “Qevir Plan.” Oversight was assigned to institutions under direct regime control, particularly the restructured Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which was granted greater independence and authority to advance the development of nuclear arms.
What Are the Objectives and Components of the Qevir Plan?
The Qevir Plan seeks to develop advanced nuclear weapons capabilities by embedding them within civilian programs—particularly satellite launch initiatives. The project is centered in the remote deserts of Semnan Province, with operational reach extending to Tehran and Qom. Since 2009, large parts of Semnan have been designated closed military zones.
The plan aims to develop nuclear warheads with greater destructive potential and longer-range delivery systems—exceeding 3,000 kilometers—thereby expanding Iran’s ability to threaten regional and international adversaries. These developments are masked by declared efforts in satellite launch vehicles, such as the liquid-fueled “Simorgh” and the solid-fueled “Qaem-100.”
What Is the Security and Geographical Framework of the Qevir Project?
The Iranian regime has divided Semnan Province into three security zones:
- Red Zone: Complete military restriction with no civilian access (covering 9% of the province)
- Yellow Zone: Under military control for missile and artillery testing, with restricted flight paths and entry permits (27%)
- Blue Zone: Civilians are allowed, but nearly half the area is designated as natural reserves under heavy surveillance
The primary sites associated with the project include:
- Rangin Kaman Site (Eyvanaki)
- Ghadir Radar Installation
- Meraj-1 Complex for Simorgh warhead development
- Imam Reza Training Center (Shahroud missile site)
- Sanjarian Facility
- _Sorkheh Hesar
- Parchin Military Complex
Each facility plays a special role in warhead design, explosive testing, or nuclear component manufacturing.
What Camouflage and Security Measures Are Used by the Regime?
To protect Qevir from exposure, the Iranian regime employs a sophisticated multilayered security system, including:
- A dedicated security unit known as “Qevir Security”
- An IRGC-run intelligence base named “Sahib al-Zaman”
- Deliberate removal of strategic routes from official maps
- Surveillance through drones, smart cameras, and facial recognition technologies
- Tight restrictions on foreign nationals, particularly Western researchers and tourists, including repeated incidents of detention and interrogation
All sites are subject to continuous aerial monitoring via light reconnaissance planes and drones, supplemented by advanced facial recognition and satellite surveillance systems for total informational control.
Project Sites and Their Technical Functions
Activities are distributed across several locations, each serving a specific technical function:
- “Noor” Building (Tehran): Central command and oversight for nuclear weapons development
- Shahroud Site: Warhead development for the Qaem-100 solid-fueled missile
- Semnan Facility: Warhead work for Simorgh rockets and additional weapons testing
- Eyvanaki: Assembly of nuclear warhead components
- Sanjarian: Design of shockwave generators for triggering nuclear explosions
- Sorkheh Hesar: Underground and geophysical testing
- Parchin: Production of explosives and warhead detonation systems
In contrast, the earlier Amad Project operated at:
- Lavizan-Shian (command center)
- Gachin (uranium mining)
- Fordow (uranium enrichment)
- Sanjarian (shockwave generators)
- Abadeh (neutron testing)
- Mahallati (metal casing manufacturing)
- Meydan (underground testing)
- Boroujerd (final assembly)
- Hemmat (missile warhead integration)
Political and Security Implications of Iran’s Nuclear Activities
The Qevir Plan highlights a strategic shift by Iran toward using civilian cover to conduct military nuclear development—bypassing international inspections and agreements. According to the IAEA’s recent findings and opposition disclosures, Iran has intensified its pursuit of nuclear weapons, jeopardizing both regional stability and the credibility of international non-proliferation regimes.
The Iranian opposition has urged immediate activation of the UN’s “snapback sanctions” mechanism and a complete shutdown of Iran’s nuclear facilities under IAEA oversight, particularly as key international restrictions are due to expire in October.
Conclusion
For over thirty years, the Iranian opposition—led by the NCRI—has warned that the regime in Tehran has never abandoned its quest for nuclear weapons. Whether under the names “Amad” or “Qevir,” these programs have consistently served military ends under the façade of civilian progress.
Despite Tehran’s deliberate deception and deflection, the opposition has repeatedly presented credible evidence to the world. Yet, international leniency, especially in recent years, has prevented decisive action or meaningful deterrence.
This policy of appeasement has granted Iran the opportunity to enhance its nuclear infrastructure and develop military technologies under the guise of peaceful space initiatives. This ongoing complacency endangers not only the Middle East, but the global system that upholds non-proliferation norms.
The Iranian resistance once again stresses: any delay or inaction will enable the regime to edge closer to achieving a nuclear bomb. Only through swift, resolute international measures—reinstating sanctions and shutting down nuclear sites under IAEA control—can the world contain this imminent threat and restore the hope of regional and global peace.
