Over the past two decades, Turkey’s foreign policy has undergone a significant transformation—particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. This shift has largely been driven by mounting discoveries of natural gas, prompting Ankara to prioritize maritime demarcation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in a region where it claims a relatively limited share compared to neighboring states.
Following the collapse of the Syrian regime on December 8, 2024, Turkey moved swiftly to deepen its influence in Syria through an alliance with the new political leadership. Within weeks, Turkish Minister of Transport Abdulkadir Uraloğlu announced Ankara’s intention to initiate maritime boundary negotiations with Syria. He stated such an agreement could “alter the entire balance” in the Eastern Mediterranean by expanding the energy exploration zones of both countries.
Expanding Maritime Control and Regional Energy Integration
Turkey’s ultimate goal, according to multiple sources, is to expand its EEZ through bilateral agreements, gaining greater control over the Mediterranean and its gas reserves. This ambition aligns with Ankara’s broader objective of becoming a regional energy hub. The fall of Bashar al-Assad could facilitate this strategy, enabling Turkey to position Syria as a transit corridor for Israeli and Egyptian gas destined for Turkey and Europe.
Energy: The Key to Syria’s Reconstruction
Before the outbreak of Syria’s civil war in 2011, the country’s oil and gas reserves allowed it to be energy self-sufficient and even an exporter. Oil and gas accounted for about 20% of the government’s revenues.
In the post-war reconstruction phase, Turkish energy firms such as TPAO and BOTAŞ are expected to play a leading role in Syria’s oil, gas, and electricity sectors. Azerbaijan, a close ally of Turkey, is also likely to contribute, having already delivered substantial fuel aid to Syria. Given this trilateral alliance, Azerbaijan is well-positioned to collaborate with Ankara and Turkish energy firms in rebuilding Syria’s energy infrastructure.
Turkey plans to lead Syria’s energy recovery, aiming to help develop oil and gas reserves and use energy exports to fund reconstruction. Syrian oil could be refined in Turkish facilities. Improved electricity supply from Syria could also benefit neighboring Lebanon, which suffers from chronic power shortages. Syria may also become a conduit for future gas deliveries to Lebanon—either directly or via Turkey.
Turkey’s interest is not limited to gaining control over Syria’s maritime zones. Ankara sees the creation of a stable Syrian state as an opportunity to build a western gas pipeline linking Syria to the Arab Gas Pipeline (which connects Egypt, Jordan, and Syria). This network would give regional gas producers such as Israel and Egypt a more commercially viable export route to Europe compared to current liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipping options.
A stable Syria could also revive the long-stalled Qatar–Turkey gas pipeline project, which would traverse Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria—offering a competing route to other regional projects. The EastMed pipeline, once the flagship of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), has struggled with technical and financial feasibility. The proposed 1,900 km deep-sea pipeline linking Israel and Cyprus to Greece has made little progress and suffered a blow when the U.S. withdrew its support in 2022.
By contrast, a land route via Syria into Turkey’s existing infrastructure is shorter, more technologically feasible, and more cost-effective. Lebanon—now engaged in offshore gas exploration but lacking export infrastructure—may find the Turkish route especially attractive if its exploration proves fruitful. Lebanon is not a member of the EMGF and may benefit from Turkey’s growing role.
Beyond Fossil Fuels: Turkey’s Renewable Energy Model
Turkish officials have also expressed interest in collaborating with Syria on renewable energy. In 2023, Turkey generated 43% of its electricity from a combination of wind, solar, and hydropower. This experience could serve as a model for post-war Syria, especially given the country’s abundant solar resources and urgent need to rebuild energy infrastructure.
Integration of the Turkish and Syrian electricity grids would be a vital link in the emerging Eastern Mediterranean power network. Such infrastructure would help manage renewable energy variability while reinforcing Turkey’s status as a central hub in a growing regional energy system.
Syria’s Role in the “Blue Homeland” Doctrine
Since the fall of the Assad regime, Turkey has pursued a defense agreement with Syria—mirroring deals it previously signed with Azerbaijan, Qatar, Somalia, and Libya. Such agreements aim to expand Turkey’s strategic depth in the Eastern Mediterranean. Maritime boundary demarcation with Syria could support Ankara’s long-standing “Blue Homeland” doctrine, which seeks to extend Turkish control over key maritime zones.
Turkey’s interpretation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which redrew Turkish borders after WWI without granting substantial maritime rights, remains central to its policy. While Ankara has not signed the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, it continues to pursue bilateral maritime agreements to assert its EEZ claims.
This strategic vision was made clear at the 2025 Istanbul Energy Summit, where Turkey hosted ministers from major gas-producing countries including Azerbaijan, Libya, and Uzbekistan, as well as transit nations such as Georgia and importers from Eastern Europe. Ankara seeks to become the main conduit linking eastern and southern gas producers to western markets.
Turkey’s existing infrastructure supports these ambitions. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), part of the Southern Gas Corridor carrying Azerbaijani gas to Europe, is a prime example. Turkey has seven gas pipelines, five LNG terminals, three floating storage units, two underground storage sites, and significant surplus import capacity.
The “Blue Homeland” Strategy in Action
Originally developed in 2006 by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz and later advanced by Rear Admiral Cihat Yaycı, the “Blue Homeland” strategy asserts Turkish rights over nearly 462,000 km² across the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas. It calls for expanding maritime influence and establishing military installations to reinforce Turkey’s presence in former Ottoman domains.
If Turkey and Syria sign a maritime demarcation agreement, it could add roughly 1,500 square miles to Turkey’s maritime control, marking a new chapter in the implementation of this doctrine. The strategy closely mirrors Turkey’s 2019 maritime deal with Libya’s Government of National Accord, which granted Turkey expansive economic rights and disrupted the EastMed pipeline project. That agreement dismissed the influence of the island of Crete, allowing Ankara to claim waters contested by Greece and Cyprus.
Regional and International Reactions
Athens remains alert to the potential implications of a Turkish-Syrian EEZ agreement, which could jeopardize Cypriot maritime interests. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides briefed EU counterparts on the matter, stressing that any such deal could ignore Cyprus’s sovereign rights.
Mitsotakis noted that the discussions are speculative and based on media reports, but reminded the EU that the Turkey–Libya maritime agreement of 2019 was declared void and illegal under international law. He also emphasized that Syria currently lacks a stable or transitional governing structure, making negotiations premature.
Ahead of an EU meeting in Brussels, Mitsotakis reaffirmed support for Syrian territorial integrity and called for an inclusive government that upholds minority rights. He urged a unified EU stance on Syria, pledging that Greece would help shape a coherent bloc response.
Cyprus, drawing on past confrontations with Ankara, remains diplomatically vigilant. Turkey has previously sought to obstruct agreements between Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel.
Competing Projects
On December 23, Greece and Israel signed an energy agreement to establish a “green” power corridor linking Israel to the EU via Greece. This move is meant to accelerate the stalled Greece–Cyprus–Israel electricity interconnection project, which involves the world’s longest high-voltage submarine cable. Turkey, embroiled in tensions with Israel over Gaza, opposes this project.
Despite geopolitical hurdles, Syria could still be integrated into the regional gas trade. It might become a transit route for Israeli and Egyptian gas to Europe via Turkey. While seemingly unlikely, this concept is not new. In 2021 and 2022, U.S. energy envoy Amos Hochstein led efforts to export Egyptian gas through Jordan to Syria and Lebanon along the Arab Gas Pipeline. Lebanon and Syria signed gas import deals with Egypt, while Egypt agreed to import additional Israeli gas via Jordan—ultimately sending Israeli gas, under Egyptian branding, to Syria and Lebanon.
Although direct ties between Syria and Israel are absent and Turkish-Israeli relations are strained, both share strategic interests in Syria: promoting stability, preventing terrorism, and curbing Iranian influence. The latter concern may prompt the U.S. to back Turkish initiatives in Syria, especially given Ankara’s strong relationship with Syria’s new leadership—an advantage not shared by Israel, which faces deep public hostility inside Syria.
With multiple political and military actors in Syria, the country is poised to become a maritime and political battleground between Turkey and its regional rivals. While no definitive evidence links Ankara to recent sectarian tensions on the Syrian coast, its indirect influence through allied groups is central to advancing a future maritime agreement.
Lifting Sanctions: Key to Energy Projects
Financing Syria’s energy recovery will require the easing—or suspension—of U.S., EU, and UK sanctions imposed under Assad’s regime. The U.S. has already granted a six-month waiver for humanitarian fuel deliveries. A broader lifting of sanctions under a Trump administration appears possible, including potential presidential waivers independent of Congressional approval. Congressional support, however, will depend on Syria’s new government and Turkey’s conduct.
Additionally, waivers from World Bank and G7 fossil fuel financing restrictions would be necessary to unlock public funding for rebuilding Syria’s energy production and infrastructure.
Key Conclusions:
- Post-Assad, Turkey seeks a maritime border agreement with Syria’s new government. Such a deal could grant Ankara additional EEZ territory and further its “Blue Homeland” maritime doctrine.
- Turkey views Syria as a transit corridor for Israeli, Egyptian, and Qatari gas to Europe, aiming to integrate Syria into regional trade routes, including the Arab Gas Pipeline. This would offer cheaper, more viable alternatives to complex marine projects like EastMed.
- Ankara plans to lead Syria’s energy reconstruction, deploying Turkish firms (TPAO, BOTAŞ) and partnering with Azerbaijan. Plans include refining Syrian oil in Turkey and improving electricity supply for Syria and Lebanon._
- Turkey’s expanding influence has alarmed EMGF members like Greece and Cyprus, who seek to block Turkish Syrian maritime deals that could undermine their maritime and economic interests.
