Algerian security sources have confirmed that the military agreement signed between Algeria and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) played a decisive role in ending the presence of Russia’s Wagner paramilitary group in Mali. Wagner officially announced over the past weekend that it had completed its operations successfully.
In this context, Algerian military and security affairs expert Akram Kharief, who runs the website MenaDefense, noted that the decision by Wagner reflects several overlapping factors, including the alignment of Algerian and Russian interests in the region. He also suggested that Moscow may have acted to impose a level of discipline on its military proxy in Mali, in a manner that would not antagonize Algeria—its strategic partner in North Africa. Wagner, over the past few months, had moved its operations perilously close to Algeria’s borders.
A Secret Military Pact Between Algeria and the U.S.
Kharief further asserted that the secret military agreement signed between Algeria and the United States in recent weeks may have included provisions to contain or push back against Russian influence in the Sahel region. Moscow may have picked up on this shift and moved to recalibrate its strategy in a way that would alleviate Algerian security concerns and preserve the country’s regional leadership role.
Doubts had already been mounting over the effectiveness of Wagner’s fighters, especially following numerous casualties, reports of disorganization in combat operations, and accusations of mass atrocities against civilians. These developments, coupled with rising political pressure, likely forced Moscow to withdraw Wagner from Mali. The group is expected to be replaced by the newly formed “African Corps,” which operates under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defense.
From Washington’s perspective, Algeria is a key partner in limiting the expansion of Russian influence and curbing the growing alignment between Moscow and several military-led regimes in the Sahel. This aligns with one of the core objectives of the U.S.-Algeria agreement.
President Abdelmadjid Tebboune of Algeria publicly supported the accord, asserting that the deal does not contradict Algeria’s strategic partnerships—particularly with Russia—but rather reflects a broader strategy of diversifying alliances in a way that serves Algeria’s national interests and enhances its security.
Squeezing Wagner’s Grip
Political analysts monitoring North Africa suggest the agreement’s primary objective is to constrain Wagner’s operations by shielding the Malian Tuareg opposition groups in Azawad, which Wagner had targeted in 2024 as part of its alliance with Mali’s military regime under Colonel Assimi Goïta. This collaboration allowed Malian forces and Wagner to take control of Kidal in November 2024—one of the last strongholds of the northern opposition.
This strategic shift also appears to be linked to the Algerian military’s downing of a Malian drone in early April 2025 near the border, allegedly engaged in tracking Azawad opposition forces. The incident sparked a sharp diplomatic crisis between Algiers and Bamako, with the latter describing it as an “act of war.”
In a notable diplomatic move related to Wagner, Algeria formally raised the issue of the group’s activities near its southern border during a meeting between Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov on February 20, 2025, in Johannesburg, during the G20 ministerial summit.
Following the meeting, Attaf publicly stated in Algiers that Algeria had conveyed its “concern” to Moscow about Wagner’s activities, particularly in Mali and Niger.
Wagner’s Defeat in Africa
Akram Kharief highlighted other reasons behind Wagner’s retreat from Mali. He pointed to the July 25, 2024, offensive on Tinzaouaten near the Algerian border, jointly launched by Malian forces and Wagner, which ended in disaster. Fierce resistance by Azawad forces, followed by an ambush by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) the next day, resulted in the deaths of 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers. Military equipment, including a helicopter, was also destroyed. Kharief described this battle as Wagner’s worst defeat in Africa.
Following this failure, Wagner and the Malian army launched another offensive in October 2024. However, Algeria intervened decisively, employing ground, aerial, and even satellite surveillance, and informed Moscow of its firm opposition to any escalation. The operation was aborted without a single shot fired.
This, Kharief noted, represented yet another political and psychological defeat for Wagner. Through a coordinated diplomatic campaign and precise field pressure, Algeria succeeded in ending the militia’s presence along its southern borders—a move that restored balance to the Sahel region.
On June 6, 2025, Wagner officially announced via its Telegram channel the end of its mission in Mali. This marks the loss of a lucrative contract with the Malian junta and the forfeiture of privileges over the Nataka gold mine—the largest artisanal mining site in northern Mali, which Wagner had taken over in February 2024.
Malian Silence
The Malian government has yet to release an official statement regarding Wagner’s withdrawal, despite the ongoing security crisis triggered by JNIM’s increased activity near the capital, Bamako. JNIM has also reportedly entered negotiations with local tribal leaders, urging them to surrender their weapons in exchange for protection.
Wagner’s initial deployment to Mali dates back to 2022, under an agreement with the country’s military rulers. Despite the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in a mysterious plane crash in 2023, the group continued to spearhead operations aimed at suppressing the Azawad rebellion and restoring government control over the north—especially after the withdrawal of French forces and the termination of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA).
Russia, however, seems determined not to relinquish its growing influence in Mali and the broader Sahel. Just hours after Wagner announced its withdrawal, the Russian “African Corps” declared it would remain active in Mali.
According to international media reports, the African Corps stated via its Telegram channel that Wagner’s departure would not alter Russia’s military posture in Mali. Instead, it emphasized that Moscow was doubling down on its support for Bamako.
The African Corps, established in early 2024, comprises 70–80% former Wagner operatives and is overseen by Russian Deputy Defense Minister General Yunus-bek Yevkurov. The force is deployed across five African nations—Libya, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. Libya hosts its central command, and total personnel strength ranges between 40,000 and 45,000. Recruitment began in December 2023 in Russia and several African countries.
These developments signal Russia’s intention to consolidate and reorganize its military footprint in Africa with a more structured and strategic approach—an effort that Wagner, as a private militia, was ill-equipped to manage.
Mauritania: Neutral But Anxious
In parallel, neighboring Mauritania is closely monitoring the situation with increasing concern. The country recognizes that Mali’s deteriorating security situation is no longer a purely internal matter but poses a direct threat to its own border stability.
President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani has adopted a unique approach to regional crises, based on positive neutrality and unwavering sovereignty. According to sources close to him, he has consistently resisted pressure to align with volatile international alliances or drag the Mauritanian military into foreign conflicts. Instead, Nouakchott has focused on securing its borders and providing humanitarian and logistical support to civilians affected by regional instability.
This strategy—balancing caution with readiness—has helped Mauritania maintain stability amid a turbulent neighborhood. Its approach stands in contrast to militarized or externally dependent solutions.
However, Mauritania’s longstanding policy of neutrality is increasingly under strain. The accelerating security collapse in Mali threatens to derail Nouakchott’s delicate balancing act.
In a region that punishes hesitation, Mauritania understands that its border with Mali could quickly shift from a geographic boundary to a frontline hotspot. Amid the chaos of armed groups, evolving Russian deployments, and an intensifying global power contest, Mauritania’s concerns are not only justified—they serve as an early warning for the entire region.
Key Actors in Mali’s Complex Crisis
The situation in Mali remains highly complex, defying simplistic narratives or binary divisions. The conflict is multilayered, involving local, regional, and international actors.
Among the most prominent players are the Azawad nationalist movements, which demand autonomy or independence. While some of these groups have formed tactical alliances with jihadist factions, not all are extremist as their detractors claim.
Other influential forces include jihadist organizations such as al-Mourabitoun, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), ISIS, and the Macina Liberation Front, in addition to JNIM, which serves as an umbrella group for many of these factions.
The Malian army is another key player, but it suffers from significant operational weaknesses, lack of professionalism, and accusations of committing abuses—particularly against Arab and Tuareg communities in the north.
Also active are pro-army militias, which, according to investigative reports, are even more brutal and ethnically driven in their operations.
International stakeholders include France—now ostracized by Mali’s current leadership—Russia via Wagner, Turkey through its drones and advisers, and to a lesser extent, Germany and the United States.
Non-traditional actors also play a significant role, particularly arms traffickers and drug cartels, who exert considerable influence over both the economic and security landscapes.
As for the potential losers in this evolving scene, Turkey may find its military bet in the region slipping, while Morocco risks exclusion from the post-Wagner reconfiguration. Meanwhile, Mauritania occupies the seat of the silent, cautious observer—pursuing a “watchful waiting” policy, even as it retains significant soft-power tools in Mali through religious and tribal ties.
