Last month we had the Algerian analysis of the crisis in Franco-Algerian relations, and in order to get a balanced view on the matter, we spoke to Xavier Driencourt, French diplomat and Ambassador to Algeria (2007-2012, 2017-2020). The interview was carried out by Denys Kolesnyk, French consultant and analyst, President of the MENA Research Center.
Algeria recently announced the expulsion of 15 French diplomats that marks a new escalation in the diplomatic crisis between Paris and Algiers. Could you explain the reasons for this crisis and the dynamics that have led to this intensification of tensions?
Sometimes we forget, but the current crisis between France and Algeria has its origins in a decision taken by France on 30 July 2024, when French President Emmanuel Macron sent a letter to the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, officially recognising Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. The letter used particularly strong language, stating in particular that “France considers that the present and future of Western Sahara fall within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty“. Unsurprisingly, this provoked a negative reaction from Algiers, paving the way for a new Franco-Algerian crisis.
Since July 2024, a new crisis has taken hold, marked by a steady escalation in tensions. Relations between France and Algeria, historically marked by cycles of improvement and deterioration, are now at their lowest level since Algerian independence in 1962. As you said, we have seen French diplomats expelled from Algeria and Algerian diplomats expelled from France, which is an unprecedented situation. The only similar precedent dates back to 1983, when we expelled Soviet agents in the so-called “Farewell” affair.
Since last July, we have witnessed an escalation in tension between France and Algeria, culminating in a complete breakdown in relations. In other words, the bridges now seem to be cut off.
Finally, it should perhaps be reminded that the decision to recognise Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara on 30 July was taken by a resigning French government, tasked with dealing with current affairs, following the resignation of Gabriel Attal after the dissolution of the National Assembly. Consequently, from a legal point of view, such a government undoubtedly did not have the power to take such important decisions, which do not fall within the jurisprudential definition of “current affairs”; this renders this recognition fragile from a legal standpoint, even if politically this is not the case, with serious consequences for relations with Algeria.
On a final note, this crisis appears, at least from my personal point of view, to be a fiasco of French diplomacy.
And, in your opinion, could this decision be reversible, given the fragility you have just mentioned?
Absolutely not. Today the President has chosen Morocco and this decision is irreversible. You will also note that in the communiqué issued by Algiers during the visit of French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot in early May, there is no mention of the Western Sahara. So the Algerians have written the matter off.
And that brings us to our second question. Last March, an attempt was made to defuse this crisis. Presidents Macron and Tebboune held talks with the aim of easing tensions. Although they agreed on a number of measures to improve the situation, this initiative does not seem to have borne fruits. How would you explain the failure of this attempt at appeasement?
As you pointed out, there was a telephone call between Presidents Tebboune and Macron, and then Minister Barrot was sent to Algiers. Prior to this, the Algerian President had made a speech that seemed to open a door, saying: “My interlocutor is President Macron or whomever he wishes to appoint“. That person was Minister Barrot — a way of preventing Mr Retailleau from representing France in the dialogue with Algeria.
At the time of Mr Barrot’s visit, it was hoped that the crisis would be resolved. And then — boom — a court case interfered with the momentum, with the arrest of an Algerian consulate official in Créteil, involved in the kidnapping of an Algerian influencer, Amir Dz. Shortly afterwards, the first secretary of the Algerian embassy was also implicated, and the case took a completely different turn.
It was at this point that tensions escalated. Algiers reacted by expelling 15 French diplomats, and Paris responded by expelling 15 Algerian diplomats from its consulates. And very recently, last week, Algiers refused entry to its territory to 15 French agents sent on diplomatic passports for a temporary mission of 90 days. This refusal is a violation of the 2013 agreement on diplomatic passports.
And how did we react?
We reacted the day before yesterday with France’s decision to no longer recognise the validity of the 2013 agreement on diplomatic passports. Since Algiers was blocking the entry into its territory of holders of French diplomatic passports, the government issued a press release stating that, from now on, Algerians holding diplomatic passports will also have to obtain a visa to enter French territory.
You were French ambassador to Algeria on two occasions, from 2008 to 2012, and then from 2017 to 2020. What were the main issues and challenges affecting bilateral relations during these periods? And what difficulties did you personally encounter as head of mission in Algiers?
I have indeed been ambassador to Algiers on two occasions, at very different times and in very different contexts. My first mandate took place under Bouteflika, but a Bouteflika who still had all the power and all his lucidity. The relationship was already complex — it’s in the very nature of Franco-Algerian relations to be complicated. There were tensions already.
When I arrived in Algiers in July 2008, an Algerian diplomat had been arrested in France by an investigative judge. And he wasn’t just anyone: he was President Bouteflika’s chief of protocol, a foreign affairs representative. This affair caused a major diplomatic crisis, which we tend to forget today. For a year, a year and a half, relations were very tense between Paris and Algiers, to the point where no French minister could visit Algeria — the Algerian authorities refused all ministerial visits.
The situation was finally unblocked thanks to a form of mediation led by former Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who spent eight months trying to pick up the pieces. Gradually, relations were re-established: the Secretary General of the Élysée Palace, Claude Guéant, and the President’s diplomatic adviser, Jean-David Levitte, came to Algiers. At the end of my term of office, from 2010, relations were excellent. It was the era of “everything’s going well” — we were practically embracing each other.
But my second mandate was of a completely different thing. I experienced three distinct periods. The first year, Bouteflika was still President but very ill: he no longer spoke or received foreign visitors. The domestic political situation was extremely tense, with everyone in politics speculating about his succession.
The second phase was from 2019 to early 2020: a very difficult year, marked by the Hirak, the vast popular protest movement that led to Bouteflika’s resignation.
Finally, the third period corresponds to the start of President Tebboune’s term of office. Once again, a new context, new points of reference. As for the Western Sahara, of course we talked about it, but it wasn’t a central issue in bilateral relations or a major source of difficulty at the time. The Algerians were aware of our balanced position.
But what can be done concretely to get out of this crisis? Perhaps you have some ideas?
No. The situation is deadlocked and there is no real room for manoeuvre. In my opinion, the crisis is likely to last until 2027, until the next French presidential election. I don’t see any real way out before then.
There are perhaps two or three possible scenarios — even if what I’m about to say is more of a hypothesis or political fiction:
First scenario, the most sombre: we could go as far as breaking off diplomatic relations, which could happen, for example, around 5 July, the anniversary of Algerian independence. Algiers could then hope to capitalise on this date and its supposed firmness towards the former colonial power. But a break, despite the appearance of firmness, would have very negative consequences for the Algerian system, which may not be ready to pay the price.
A second scenario would be to seek appeasement, again around 5 July, with the pardon granted to Boualem Sansal. Even in this scenario, normalising relations with Paris will be difficult, given the extent of the damage caused by Algiers. Among the consequences — one that is rarely mentioned — is Algeria’s now entirely negative image in France. This government could really use a good PR agency!
A third hypothesis could be as follows: within the Algerian political “system”, a system of power, we forget, which is not homogenous, certain players could at some point tell President Tebboune that he has gone too far, that he has provoked unnecessary tensions, that his foreign policy is a failure. Today, Algeria has problems with Morocco, France, Mali, Niger, Libya and even the United Arab Emirates. And President Tebboune didn’t even go to Moscow on 9 May, when many foreign leaders were there. This reflects the country’s growing isolation, which is undoubtedly underestimated.
These three hypotheses may, in fact, be cumulative.
Last month, we interviewed an Algerian expert to discuss the accumulated problems between France and Algeria. In particular, he mentioned the existence of a “memorial debt” that the two countries should, in his view, settle in order to improve their bilateral relations.
It’s a recurring theme in Algerian official discourse: the idea of a memorial debt presented as an indispensable prerequisite for any normalisation. But at some point, you have to know how to turn the page. The debt, if there was one, has been paid. Algeria has been independent since 1962, that’s 63 years now.
And it must be acknowledged that France, in recent years — particularly under the impetus of President Macron — has made a number of important gestures in terms of acknowledging the past. Yet, Algeria continues to demand always more in terms of recognition or repentance. This is largely due to the fact that this demand for remembrance forms the basis of the current regime’s legitimacy.
Perhaps it is time to make it clear that this cannot go on forever. At some point, we have to move on and turn the page. Look at Vietnam, which suffered so much under French colonisation: the President of the Republic is starting a tour of Asia with a state visit to Vietnam, without dwelling on the past.
So, in your opinion, what concrete measures should be taken — apart of course from the question of the “memorial debt” claimed by Algeria — to resolve, or at least begin to resolve, the problems accumulated in the bilateral relatons? Let’s imagine, for example, a post-2027 context, after Emmanuel Macron: what could be done?
Once again, I think that nothing will change between now and 2027. We’ll have to wait until then to consider a complete overhaul of our relationship with Algeria. In my opinion, this is the only way forward. Because we can’t go on like this. It is clear that the policy pursued by Minister Barrot and President Macron is not leading anywhere. As I was saying, the Sahara affair is a diplomatic fiasco. In 2027, we will have to completely rethink our relationship with Algeria.
Let’s imagine that the Algerians say to us: “In any case, since you have recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara, this will remain a permanent obstacle between us”. Is that really possible?
No. Let’s be clear — this issue is now settled. It can no longer remain a perpetual stumbling block in our relationship.
Today, this issue has become a pretext, and we have to make it clear that it’s over. Algeria is virtually the only country to continue to recognise Western Sahara and support the Polisario Front. Most other countries are taking a more pragmatic approach and recognise that Morocco is conducting very active diplomacy on the African continent. Many African states are now leaning in Morocco’s favour.
Morocco has also seen real economic development. Just look at the flights operated by Royal Air Maroc, which, like Turkish Airlines, serves the whole of the African continent. Morocco is often cited as a model of development: it has neither gas nor oil, but it is supported by a high-performance agricultural sector and a solid industrial base — in particular a cutting-edge automotive industry. If you go to Tangier, you’ll be impressed by the scale of the industrial site. The country also has a dynamic tourist industry.
Algeria, for its part, has chosen a different development model. That’s its right, but it’s not France’s fault. It’s time to stop blaming France for choices and mistakes that are the sole responsibility of the Algerian authorities.
Algeria has privileged relations with Russia: there have been arms purchases, numerous agreements… and this raises questions, particularly because Moscow’s actions today threaten European security. We know that Russia is engaged in a war against Ukraine and represents a direct threat to NATO’s eastern flank. To what extent does this proximity between Algiers and Moscow influence Franco-Algerian relations?
This is an important external factor in the bilateral relationship between France and Algeria. This proximity could potentially disrupt things if Moscow decided to play this card to put pressure on President Macron, who, as we know, is very active with the regard to Ukraine.
But once again, we must not overestimate this relationship. As I said earlier, Algeria is diplomatically isolated today. It is at loggerheads with many countries, and its relations with Russia are not as exceptional as one might think. Putin’s Russia has other priorities: its top priority is Ukraine, not Algeria.
We also saw a few months ago that Moscow did not intervene to save Bashar al-Assad in a critical situation. So, would Russia ever intervene to “save” Tebboune? That’s a real question. There’s nothing to guarantee it.
It’s a very good question. And since we mentioned Russia earlier, what do you think Algeria’s foreign policy approach is towards the United States? We know that Morocco has excellent relations with Washington. And, if we widen the perspective a little, what is Algeria’s position in relation to the great powers such as China, the United States and, of course, the European Union?
Algeria enjoys good relations with China, but these remain essentially commercial. China has a strong presence in Algeria through numerous infrastructure projects.
On the other hand, in military and political terms, Algeria is closer to Russia, the heir to the USSR, with which it has had links since the 1960s.
As for the United States, the relationship is more ambiguous. Algeria actually fears the United States, because it sees it as a global superpower: Atlantic, European, Mediterranean, economic and financial. This mistrust is fuelled by several factors.
Firstly, the United States is a strategic ally of Israel, which is not well perceived by Algiers. Secondly, Washington also has a solid alliance with Morocco. The Abraham Accords have strengthened this US-Israel-Morocco triangle, further isolating Algeria.
Finally, Algeria fears a possible change in the US position towards the Polisario Front. If a future American president — especially someone as unpredictable as Donald Trump — were to decide to classify the Polisario as a terrorist organisation, in the same way as the decisions taken with regard to the PLO, this would be a major blow to Algiers. It would call into question its support for the movement and could complicate its economic relations with Washington.
And, to conclude our interview, I’d like to ask you about Mali. Recently, there have been tensions in the region of southern Algeria and northern Mali. Can you briefly explain, why there is a large Algerian military presence in the south of the country? And more generally, what is Algeria’s role in this area?
Algeria’s southern border is extremely porous, because it crosses the Sahara desert. There are 3000 km of desert shared with Mali, and as much with Libya and Niger. For Algeria, it is therefore a major strategic zone. Mali has always been seen as Algeria’s backyard, its geographical depth. This is why Algeria has always worked to ensure the stability of Mali. In particular, it played a central role in the 2005 Algiers agreements for Malian reconciliation.
But today, there has been a break with Mali. Last September, during a session at the UN, the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs described the Algerian representative as an “madman”. The Malian military expelled Algeria. This is the first time since 1962 that Algeria has suffered such a setback on its southern border. This failure is all the more significant in that Russia, via the Wagner group, is now supporting the Malian military against Algerian influence. This illustrates the complexity of the current geopolitical game in the region.
