Türkiye seeks to improve its relations with the United States and ease tensions between them for years in which the NATO member State wants to reap the results of its recent positions as the war begins in Ukraine, such as adhering to Western sanctions on Russia and agreeing to expand NATO to include both Sweden and Finland. In return, the United States want to push Ankara towards greater convergence of the Western position and strengthen confidence among NATO countries. Relations remain in doubt, owing to the rapprochement and cooperation that has prevailed over the last ten years between Ankara and Moscow. Recent efforts to improve relations with the United States have been known as “Strategic Mechanism”, a series of consultative meetings between Washington and Ankara to resolve intractable disputes or reach certain consensus around them, both of which continued to maintain a high diplomatic thread after tense relations, preceded by the imposition of sanctions against Türkiye by the United States in mid-December 2020 under a law “Fighting America’s enemies“, following Ankara deal to buy Russian defence systems. The White House has faced a ban on all export licenses and permits, freezing officials’ financial assets of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government.
On March 7 and 8 this year, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan discussed with his US counterpart Anthony Blinken ways to move frozen relations, and Ankara’s eye appears to be on improving military relations, especially acquiring U.S. F-35 fighters.
In this essay, we try to define the development of Turkish-American relations, the fate of the outstanding and complex topics, focusing on the impact this has on the Turkish economy and politics and its implications for Ankara’s status, influence and relations with neighboring and distant Arab countries.
Türkiye’s position between Moscow and Washington
Türkiye works to improve military relations with the United States, by complying with financial sanctions imposed on Russia, but nonetheless maintaining its relations with Moscow, walking a fine rope between the United States and Russia. Discussions between the parties are expected to focus on lifting US sanctions against Türkiye’s military industry over its acquisition of Russia’s advanced S-400 missile defense system, which NATO members fear could pose a threat to fifth-generation F-35 stealth warplanes.
At the same time, Türkiye has been excluded from the F-35 fighter jet program, and Ankara may attempt to negotiate the payment of $1.4 billion that the country had previously invested into the initiative. The Turkish minister’s efforts follow Ankara’s approval of NATO expansion in Sweden after months of delay, paving the way for Washington to sign a $23 billion deal to sell US-made F-16 warplanes, missiles and bombs to Ankara.
Türkiye is an important Middle Eastern country for Washington. In all respects, military and strategic, the country’s air bases, which host US nuclear warheads, were used during the Cold War, similarly to launch air strikes against ISIS in Syria, and to transport supplies to American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recognizes his country’s importance to NATO and the US. Through this Türkiye plays a game of risk: on the one hand it wants to get economic gains from Russia and, on the other hand, is wishing to gain more US support in the Kurdish cause. Türkiye’s efforts to improve military relations with the United States come as Recep Tayyip Erdogan seeks to expand energy relations with Moscow, aiming to transform Türkiye into an energy hub for natural gas shipments to Europe; Türkiye has become the first NATO nation since Ukraine’s invasion to invite the Russian President to visit the country.
Meanwhile, Türkiye’s exports to Russia fell nearly 40 percent in the first two months of this year compared to 2023, as banks increased scrutiny of Russia-related transactions to avoid falling under U.S. sanctions. A Turkish oil station on the Mediterranean coast said it would no longer accept Russian imports after receiving record quantities last year.
The Turkish Foreign Minister had indicated his preference for maintaining Russian air defences, even if that meant the inability to purchase F-35 fighter jets. The United States and Türkiye have recently confirmed plans for joint production of 155 mm artillery missiles, which Ukraine desperately needs, by next year. Türkiye also asked the US for permission to participate in the production of “GE Aerospace” turbines used in F-16 aircraft for use in its locally produced fighter aircraft.
At the same time, Türkiye is trying to present itself as a potential mediator for ending the war, passing some diplomatic solutions, in order to convince the West of the need to continue its relationship with Moscow, and Türkiye has offered to host a summit between Ukraine and Russia to end the war. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in Istanbul after talks with his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky that his country was ready to hold such a summit. He reiterated that his country supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The conversation with Zelensky also discussed developments related to the war as well as the safety of shipping in the Black Sea and the failed grain convention. Türkiye will also make an important contribution to Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.
While Western countries are currently reducing their dependence on Russian energy and diversifying their energy security, Türkiye continues to rely mainly on Russia. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian war, Türkiye has become one of Russia’s most important energy importers. For this reason, Türkiye has been able to enjoy up to 30% discounts on Russian products since the beginning of the war. Turkish authorities and companies increased imports of Russian oil, saving about $2 billion in 2023.
Türkiye currently receives about 40 percent of its natural gas imports from Russia. According to data of the Association of Turkish Chambers of Engineers and Architects (TMMOB), Russia is Türkiye’s most important import partner when it comes to natural gas. About a quarter of the energy comes from Russia. According to the latest data from the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), Türkiye’s reliance on Russia for crude oil and petroleum products has now risen to 68 percent. This share was about 41% at the end of 2022. Experts note that energy projects between Russia and Türkiye will increase Türkiye’s dependence on Russia.
Even Russia’s nuclear plant, built in the Turkish city of Mersin, is 100 percent dependent on Russia. This is extremely risky. This is a major problem for energy security and economic security as well as for foreign policy.
As a result, Türkiye will never completely isolate Russia or break ties with it. However, Ankara has never had a relationship of confidence with Moscow, and there are no prospects for partnership. In fact, Türkiye views NATO membership as critical to its national interests and as an insurance card against Russian expansion.
While Türkiye will never agree to revise the 1936 Montreux Convention, which allows Ankara to have authority over the passage of military vessels into the Black Sea, it remains in Türkiye’s interest to see the Black Sea free and open to unimpeded commercial traffic, as well as freedom of navigation, the safety of cables and undersea pipelines. While Ankara remains wary of NATO’s increased presence in the Black Sea, it is likely to be more cooperative among coastal States to protect commercial activities at sea and in airspace.
Where will the relationships between Türkiye and US ends?
With the start of the war in Ukraine, the US administration soon discovered that the isolation of strategic allies political was unworkable in political terms. Washington had to work closely with Türkiye and Poland. For Türkiye, even with a strong popular mandate, President Erdogan faces significant challenges at home, including a national recovery from the 2023 earthquake and spectacular inflation. Türkiye cannot afford foreign adventures that add to the country’s problems. Conversely, the country needs foreign investment, trade and international economic partnerships to achieve growth.
Despite the disputes between the two countries, Washington seeks to win Ankara and further remove it from Moscow, there are files where progress can be made and those that seem to be sticky to change. In particular, Ankara is the largest importer of liquefied gas from Washington or the handover of Fathalla Gulen, whom Türkiye accuses of standing behind a failed coup d ‘état in 2016, as well as US support for the Kurds. There is also the Cyprus problem, the Azerbaijani peace process as well as the conflicts in Yemen, Syria and Iran. The most important case for Türkiye appears to be the issue of Washington’s support for the Kurdish fighting forces in Syria and Iraq. The last mentioned is the most important dispute, it is not easy to find a quick solution to the Kurdish file and will remain contentious unless one of the two states changes its mind, thus either continuing to receive support or fighting them.
Türkiye will likely not back down from its insistence on ending the SDF or having Kurdish forces affiliated with Türkiye that are fair to those close to the United States. Kurdish parties present in Türkiye can be crossed through the Kurdish National Council, thus becoming a strong partner, or active. Should the US position change, Türkiye is unlikely to agree to keep the Kurds in their spheres of influence without access to disarmament.
The predominant scenario is likely to be an American-Turkish convergence at the expense of Russia, so it appeared that Moscow was a little distanced, that Putin had not visited Türkiye, as well as the highly complex Syrian complex. This matched what Minister Vedan said to journalists after his talks with Blinken that his country maintained positions on Syria and F-35, as well as Türkiye was willing to discuss the matter. The Washington meeting was preceded by Turkish Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kälin’s visit to the United States and his meeting with his CIA counterpart William Burns.
However, there is no illusion that the short visits exchanged between the parties will resolve all the long-standing tensions between the two allies, and some difficult talks are expected. The toughest talks on moving forward in Syria and Ankara’s strong economic relations with Russia are likely to take place, which Washington says has helped the Kremlin circumvent some U.S. sanctions on Moscow.
Jane Shaheen, a senator from the Democratic Party, said she had discussed with Erdogan Ankara’s relationship with Moscow, adding that it was not in Türkiye’s interest for Russian President Vladimir Putin to feel “able to control any country he wants”, a clear reference to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. “The possibility of the United States and Türkiye working together is much greater than that of Türkiye and Russia working together,” she said.
What are the areas of cooperation and barbed files between Türkiye and the West?
The development of energy corridors, transport and supply chains across the Caucasus to Central Asian countries is a project that will serve the interests of Europe, the United States and Türkiye. Through the Organization of Turkish States (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan), Ankara is part of an intergovernmental body that can be an essential tool for cooperation. Negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan could improve regional stability and limit Iran’s and Russia’s influence, which would benefit Türkiye, Europe and the United States.
It is also in Türkiye’s interest to end tension with Greece, and Western countries can play a role. According to reports, relations between the two countries have improved since the earthquake and Greek efforts to contribute to humanitarian support.
Türkiye has varying relations with some important Arab countries. For example, relations between Türkiye and Egypt have been at their lowest levels for years, with almost no direct dialogue between the two governments. It is in the US interest to establish more harmonious relations. The prospects for further communication by Ankara appear promising after the elections. Regional analyst James Dorsey noted that after years of tense relations, Saudi and UAE support for President Erdogan emerged quickly after his re-election, and a reform of relations between Egypt and Türkiye would contribute to creating opportunities for energy supply from the gas-rich eastern Mediterranean to Western countries.
In Africa, where US and Turkish interests are not always compatible, Ankara is determined to play a more active role. The United States, Europe and Türkiye have a common interest in alleviating Chinese and Russian influence, especially in North and sub-Saharan Africa.
Observers of the political scene in the north of Syria believe that everything that happens will eventually be reflected in the SDF. If Ankara does not succeed in withholding US support for the Kurdish forces, the drums of war will re-beat towards a military operation that will be the fourth of its kind, preceded by operations (Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring). The second scenario, in the event of an agreement between Washington and Ankara, would be for the Kurds to seek new sponsorship, and an agreement with Russia was expected.
Expectations
With signs of Turkish convergence with the United States, the future of Russian S-400 missiles purchased by Türkiye has become increasingly questionable. The missile deal is a strong symbol of Ankara’s close ties with Moscow, but Washington offers to sell to Türkiye its advanced F35 military aircraft in exchange for the removal of Russian weapons.
US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Noland, during a visit to Istanbul, offered to revive the deal to sell aircraft if Russian missiles were removed. Apart from the $2.5 billion cost of Russian missiles, Ankara paid a heavy military and economic price through its expulsion from the F-35 programme.
Despite disagreement over the Russian missile deal, US-Turkish relations are improving as Ankara ratified Sweden’s membership to NATO, and Washington reciprocated by allowing the sale of F-16 aircraft to Türkiye. However, the F-16 is inferior to the F-35, which is due to be purchased by its neighbour and rival Greece as part of its military modernization, to Ankara’s concern.
Whether Ankara accepts Washington’s offer of F-35 in exchange for the removal of Russian-made missiles depends on progress in improving relations with the US. “It’s very important to see more moves by Washington,” says Yorok Ishik, a geopolitical analyst in Istanbul at the Washington-based Middle East Institute.
According to observers, Türkiye can easily abandon the S-400 system. It is a political decision, not a military necessity, but a dossier used by Türkiye to upgrade negotiations with NATO and the US.
Any breakthrough in Syria is likely to remain elusive after years of disagreements, but the US need for Türkiye at this stage could lead to the US abandoning the Kurds, especially as Türkiye holds on to the Bosphorus Strait and with Russia’s oil crossing and international traffic.
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